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Warranty Sales Law in Ohio
Alphonse M. Squillante*
.4 warranty gives a buyer ofgoods a basic guarantee regarding the title and quali-
ty of the goods purchased In this ,rticle, the author examines Ohio law regarding
the creation and nature of both title and quality warranties. Thepower of a seller to
disclaim warranties and to limit available remediesfor a breach of warranty are then
discussed The author also analyzes the cumulation of warranties and the benefts of
a buyer's warranty which may accrue to thirdparties. Finally, the impact of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
ASTUDY OF the historical development of the law of warran-
ties provides an insight into the manner in which the common
law forms of action, to meet the demands of a constantly changing
society, evolved and expanded into our modern Anglo-American
legal system.1 The accuracy of the comment that "the seller's war-
ranty is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract,"2 is readily apparent when one considers that a breach of
warranty, an action originally sounding in tort as deceit, is now
generally considered to be within the domain of contract law.
The difficulty in distinguishing, or even recognizing, the nature
of the warranty has produced a divergence of scholarly opinions.
Because of an imperfect understanding of the nature of the obliga-
tion imposed by a warranty and uncertainty about its origin and
the nature of its cause of action, the warranty has meandered
through the law, not quite sure of its parentage. Even today ac-
tions other than on the contract may lie for breach of warranty.
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; A.B., Wagner College;
M.S., Columbia Univeristy; LL.B., Fordham University; LL.M., N.Y.U. School of Law.
The author wishes to acknowledge the help he has received from his past and present
research assistants. Special thanks is owed to Jeffrey A. Lipps, senior research assistant to
the author.
1. The scope of this Article and the author's treatment of the subject elsewhere dic-
tate against a discussion of the common law origins of warranties. For such a discussion,
see generally 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15-1 to 15-23 (4th
ed. 1974). See also W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1936) and T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956).
2. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 634 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Necessityfor Privity of
Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HARV. L. REv. 414 (1929).
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These may include actions in deceit, negligence, 3 strict liability,
and even product liability.4
Faced with this array of potential theories of liability, the prac-
titioner should be aware that there are occasions when the plaintiff
may legitimately choose to bring a cause of action either in tort or
in contract. When there is such a choice, however, the selection
must be made with due deliberation because it may have impor-
tant consequences.- With the similarities and overlapping of the
tort and contract remedies in mind, the following discussion will
focus on the contract aspects of warranty under the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in the Ohio Revised Code.
Generally, parties to a sales transaction view warranties as
contractual obligations. Obviously, the seller may expressly
promise to answer for the quality of the goods which are sold.
Furthermore, when a promise is made to induce the buyer to buy
and the buyer gives good consideration in return for that promise
and inducement, the parties have entered into a contract of sale.
The above statement does not, however, exhaust all the possibili-
ties by which express warranties may be created by the promisor
in a contract. In addition to those resulting from the specific
words "I warrant," an express warranty may arise from certain
representations made by the seller to the buyer concerning some
aspect, trait, or quality of the goods. A statement by the seller
which operates as an express warranty need not create a contract
to be enforceable;6 a statement that induces the buyer to buy the
goods and to enter into a sale or contract for sale is an express
warranty.7 It is also possible for a warranty to be implied when
the seller makes no express representations or promises about the
goods. An implied warranty arises when the law imposes an obli-
gation upon the seller.8
A "warranty" is defined as a statement of fact respecting the
quality or character of goods sold, made by the seller to induce the
3. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 733 (1929); Williston, What Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law ofSales 21
HARV. L. REV. 555 (1908).
4. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 651.
5. For example, proof requirements, the Statute of Limitations, damages recover-
able, and the survival of actions, are all dependent upon whether the action is brought in
contract or tort. See 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note 1, at 337-40; W. PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 641-82.
6. At common law, however, such a requirement was necessary. Williston, Represen-
tation and Warranty in Sales, 27 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1913).
7. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376, 35 N.E.2d 437 (1941).
8. Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936).
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sale, and relied on by the buyer;9 or "a promise or agreement by
the seller that the article sold has certain qualities or that the seller
has a good title thereto."' 10 The warranty can determine what the
buyer has bought, including the actual physical object and any
ordinary expectations of the purchaser. Generally, warranty law
attempts to "ameliorate the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor, and,
in some measure, to impose a similar obligation on the seller to
beware.""
To this end the Ohio Revised Code provides for two types of
warranties: warranty of title' 2 and warranty of quality."' Regard-
ing warranty of title, the Code'4 provides that the seller warrants
that the title which is passed to the buyer shall be good and that
the transfer is rightful. Furthermore, there is a warranty that there
are no security interests, liens, or encumbrances against the title
which is transfered to the buyer. The warranty of title includes a
warranty against infringement. Moreover, the ability of the seller
to retain self-protection either by modification or exclusion of the
title warranty depends on whether the transaction complies with
the requirements of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-312(2).
The Code divides warranties of quality into express warranties
and implied warranties.'" Express warranties include all express
affirmations of fact or promise made by the seller. The implied
warranty applies only to merchantability and fitness of the goods
for a particular purpose. The distinction between an express war-
ranty and an implied warranty lies in interpretation because,
while these two warranties are not mutually exclusive,' 6 there
seems to be little point for a court to impose by operation of law
an implied warranty where an express warranty already exists.17
This Article first examines the provisions of the Ohio Revised
Code pertaining to warranty of title, and compares these provi-
9. Hercules Powder Co. v. Rich, 3 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 692
(1924).
10. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57, 58 (D.C. ill. 1935), aft'd, 89 F.2d
889 (7th Cir. 1936).
11. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 372, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960).
12. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.25 (Page 1979).
13. Id. §§ 1302.26-.28.
14. The terms "Code" and "the Code," for the purposes of this article, refer to the
Ohio Revised Code Annotated, not to the Uniform Commercial Code unless so designated.
15. In the Code, § 1302.26 concerns itself with express warranty, § 1302.27 speaks of
the implied warranty of merchantability, and § 1302.28 provides for the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose.
16. Q. Vandenburg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
17. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 583 (1965).
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sions with prior law. Next, the Code provisions relating to the
quality of goods-both express and implied warranties-are dis-
cussed. This Article then analyzes the statutory provisions regard-
ing the seller's power to disclaim warranties and to limit remedies
available upon breach of warranty. Next, the Article examines
provisions relating to the cumulative effect of warranties and the
requirement of privity. A final section discusses the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act.
I. WARRANTIES OF TITLE
A warranty of title enables the buyer to treat the goods in
whatever manner he or she pleases because such a right has been
conferred by operation of law.'8 A buyer who has received a war-
ranty of title is assured that no adverse party has a superior claim
or right which could interfere with the title to the goods. An ex-
ception to this general proposition is when the buyer knows that
superior title existed at the time of the sale. The Code addresses
warranty of title in two sections. Section 1302.26 protects the
buyer when the seller expressly warrants that the title is good. In
the absence of such an express affirmation, section 1302.2519 pro-
vides for a warranty of title and explains how it can be modified
or excluded.
18. The definition of title best suited to a discussion concerning warranties is "the
foundation of ownership; the basis of a person's right or the extent of his interest. The
means whereby an owner is enabled to maintain or assert his possession and enjoyment."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (3d ed. 1969); see also 63 AM. JUR. 2d Property § 43
(2d ed. 1965).
19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25 (Page 1979) provides:
Warranty of Title and against infringement; buyer's obligation against infringe-
ment.
(A) Subject to division (B) of this section there is in a contract for sale a war-
ranty by the seller that:
(1) The title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(2) The goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other
lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no
knowledge.
(B) A warranty under division (A) of this section will be excluded or modified
only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is
purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have.
(C) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the
rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like but a
buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless




A. Changes in Prior Law
Although the warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act
and the Code are nearly identical, the Code has clarified and ex-
panded some aspects of the warranty of title. The Code makes it
clear that an implied warranty of title extends to goods regardless
of whether the seller has possession at the time the agreement is
made. Statutes based on the Uniform Sales Act required the seller
to have possession of the goods at the time of contracting for a
warranty of title to exist.2" Because of the hardships such a rule
caused, the Code abolished this requirement.2'
Under prior law, the seller impliedly gave the buyer a war-
ranty of title.2" The Code, however, provides that in a contract for
sale the seller gives the buyer a warranty of title that arises when-
ever a contract is made between the parties.2 3 Even if the parties
did not intend to create such a warranty at the time of agreement,
it exists sua sponte within every contract. This type of express
warranty should be distinguished from those express warranties
which result from the "dickering" of the parties at the time a con-
tract is created. The automatic inclusion of the warranty of title in
a sales contract is designed to protect those who agree to a general
disclaimer of implied warranties, but would not understand that
the disclaimer would also abolish an implied warranty of title.
Because parties are so apt to ignore or take for granted the war-
ranty of title, the Code requires that any disclaimer of it be direct
and obvious.
The scope of the title warranty under the Code differs from its
scope under the Uniform Sales Act. The Uniform Sales Act dis-
tinguished a "sale," which meant a present right to sell, from a
"contract to sell," which meant a future right to sell. "Since prop-
erty could pass in advance of the time of delivery if the parties so
intended, there were instances in which the title warranty could be
breached even though the seller was not obligated to deliver [the
goods] until a future date."' 4 The Code makes no such distinction
between a sale and a contract for sale,25 and requires that the
20. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.14(A) (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
21. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.25, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.14 (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
23. 1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-312:3 (2d
ed. 1970). These warranties are called "ipso facto" express warranties and are distin-
guished from "contractual warranties" which arise because the parties intended them to.
Id.
24. R. NoRDsTRoM, THE LAW OF SALEs 182 (1970).
25. OHIO REV. CODE Aim. § 1302.01(11) (Page 1979).
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seller must complete performance by delivering both the goods
and good title. Consequently, under the Code the warranty of ti-
tle for goods to be delivered in the future is identical to that in
which the goods will be delivered presently.
In contrast to other warranty laws, the Code also reduces the
time in which to bring an action for breach of warranty of title.26
Prior to the Code, a buyer could wait until "quiet possession ' 27 of
the goods was disturbed before the statute of limitations began to
run. The present rule states that the limitation period commences
at the completion of the seller's performance.28 Although the doc-
trine of quiet possession is specifically abolished under the Code,29
evidence of a disturbance of quiet possession may establish that
the seller has breached the warranty of title.3°
Proof of the disturbance of quiet possession, however, is not
conclusive of whether the seller breached the warranty of title be-
cause such a disturbance may not have occurred as a result of the
seller's action. Whereas under prior law a disturbance of quiet
possession was actionable, the Code allows a seller to prove that a
disturbance was not his or her fault. To collect damages the buyer
must show a disturbance of quiet possession and the seller's liabil-
ity for the disturbance.
The changes in prior law made by the Code are subtle, yet
significant enough to make pre-Code judicial interpretations of
dubious weight. To facilitate understanding of present law, the
next section contains a more detailed look at the warranty of title
provided by the Ohio Revised Code.
B. Warranty of Title Under the Ohio Revised Code
Section 1302.24(A)(1) provides that the title which the seller
conveys to the buyer shall be good title rightfully transferred.
Since neither "good title" nor "rightful transfer" are clearly de-
fined by the Code, problems will sometimes arise as to when there
has been a breach of warranty with respect to title or delivery. It
26. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25 (Page 1979) and accompanying Official
Comments.
27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.01-.76 (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (Page 1979).
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.14 (Page 1952) is the same as that of the UNIFORM
SALES AcT § 13. It would appear that prior Ohio case law reached the same result as the
current Code. See Kwiatkowski v. Hoislbauer, 13 Ohio App. 202 (1920).
30. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
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should be noted, however, that the seller does not warrant against
illegitimate claims. As one commentator noted:
[The Code [drafters] tried to separate the spurious [as distin-
guished from the rightful] claim by limiting the warranty to a
good title and a rightful transfer. The title is good and the
transfer rightful even though an unfounded claim is presented.
The title ought not be considered good and the transfer ought
not to be rightful if the third party's claim is colorable. This
leaves an area for judicial discretion ....
The fact that the Code specifically includes the phrases "good
title" and "rightful transfer" should indicate that these two terms
are not meant to be synonymous. Indeed, the drafters of the Code
must have contemplated the situation where the seller had good
title to transfer but, because of some third party arrangement, was
unable to make a rightful transfer of those goods without breach-
ing the warranty of title.32 In such a situation it has been sug-
gested that the buyer would be able to treat the seller's warranty
of title as having been breached, cancel the contract of sale, and
bring suit to recover the purchase price of the goods with an al-
lowance for damages, thereby leaving both the seller and the third
party to litigate their rights on the agreement.33
Another important consideration when analyzing the claims of
third parties and their effect on a buyer's title is whether that per-
son has purchased the particular goods as a "buyer in the ordinary
course of business." The buyer's status is especially significant be-
cause of the provisions of section 1302.44, which states that "any
entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." 34 If the crite-
ria of "entrustment," "merchant dealing in goods of that kind,"
and "ordinary course of business" are met, the buyer will be pro-
tected.
The case of Levine v. Neilson,35 illustrates the operation of the
31. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 187.
32. Id. at 184.
33. Id.
34. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1301.01 (1) (Page 1979) defines a buyer in ordinary
course of business as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to
him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does
not include a pawnbroker." This definition takes on added weight when coupled with
§§ 1302.25 and 1302.44.
35. 37 Ohio App. 2d 29,306 N.E.2d 173 (1973). Accord, Carnegie Fin. Corp. v. Akron
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 2d 321, 361 N.E.2d 504 (1976).
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buyer in ordinary course concept. Plaintiff purchased a new car
from defendant, an automobile dealer. The cars that the dealer
offered for sale were "floor-planned"3 6 by a third party who was
also a defendant in the action. Because of inept financial planning
by the dealer and ensuing financial disputes between the dealer
and his financer, the plaintiff-buyer was never given title to the car
for which she had paid. In holding that the plaintiff had title to
the car, the court stated:
[A] seller warrants that he will convey good title free from any
security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the
buyer is without knowledge when the contract of sale is made.
Absent express contractual language, or circumstances under
which the buyer knows or should have known that only a lim-
ited warranty was intended (but only to the extent that such a
warranty can be limited), a floor-planner is bound by the war-
ranty given, having clothed the dealer with the apparent capac-
ity to sell the car and warrant title to it.
A dealer having authority to expose floor-planned cars for
sale in the ordinary course of business binds his mortgagee to
deliver title to any car so sold, when payment is made to the
dealer and whether or not the dealer remits the proceeds to the
mortgagee, unless the buyer knows or should have known of
the financing arrangements, or unless the contract of sale can
and does expressly limit the warranty given.37
In addition to protecting a buyer in the ordinary course, sec-
tion 1302.25(A)(2) provides that the goods which the seller deliv-
ers to any buyer must be free from any security interests, liens, or
encumbrances which are unknown to the buyer at the time the
contract is made.3" Nonetheless, there is no reason why a buyer
cannot agree to buy goods subject to any security interest, lien, or
encumbrance. Such limitations would probably be reflected ac-
cordingly in the purchase price of those goods. In such a case,
however, it is essential that the buyer's knowledge of such encum-
brance be actual rather than constructive.39 For example, an en-
cumbrance filed on the public record will not give the buyer actual
knowledge 4° of its existence and therefore is not effective.
36. Floor-planning is an arrangement whereby a third party "[finances the dealer's]
new and used car inventory, extending credit on demand cognovit notes under a security
agreement between [the third party] and [the seller], and holding the certificates of title or
manufacturer's or importer's certificates of ownership for the cars financed." Levin v. Neil-
son, 37 Ohio App. 2d 29, 31-32, 306 N.E.2d 173, 178 (1973).
37. Id. at 33-34, 306 N.E.2d at 179 (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
40. Knowledge is best defined in § 1302.01(Y). This definition appears to reinforce
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This warranty requires only that the goods be delivered to the
buyer unencumbered. Thus, the seller is not in default on the
warranty if a limitation which renders the title incomplete was ter-
minated prior to the delivery of those goods to the buyer. It is
essential only that when the goods are delivered to the buyer, they
have no limitation upon the title.
In addition to requiring a warranty of freedom from encum-
brances, the Code includes a separate provision4' which declares
that any claim of infringement on a patent or a trademark clouds
the buyer's title if the seller is a merchant who regularly deals in
goods of the kind which are the subject matter of the contract.
This warranty is not limited to claims of infringement, but extends
"to the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement
or the like."4 2 Therefore, it would not be necessary to show that
the buyer has been prevented from using these goods. Proof of
"eviction" is merely one of several ways of establishing that a
breach has occurred.4 3 The warranty against infringement does
not apply when the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate
that such a risk was passed to the buyer. One such circumstance is
a transaction where the seller specially produced goods con-
forming to the buyer's specifications. In this latter case, the Code
forces the buyer who offers the specifications to indemnify the
seller against any claim which may be brought against the seller
arising out of the manufacture of the conforming goods.
C. Disclaimers
Although the Code provides that every sales contract includes
a warranty of title, it also allows the warranty to be limited or
excluded. This provision demonstrates a recognition of certain in-
stances where the seller might not want to give (and the buyer
could not expect) a warranty that the title is free and clear. Con-
sequently, the Code incorporates two methods of excluding war-
ranties of title."
The first and simplest way to disclaim a title warranty is by
specific language. A buyer who agrees to a general disclaimer is
Comment I to § 1302.25 which states the "knowledge" referred to in Subsection (A)(2) is
actual knowledge as distinct from "notice."
41. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.25(C) (Page 1979). This provision is new to Ohio
law.
42. Id.
43. Id. Official Comment 4.
44. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.25(B) (Page 1979).
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probably not thinking in terms of giving up any expectations of
free and clear title; rather attention is focused on the good's physi-
cal qualities. Statements likef'as is" would be inadequate to dis-
claim the title warranty since such language refers to the physical
condition of the goods which are the subject matter of the sale.4 5
Consequently, the exclusion of a title warranty must be specific
and obvious, and it is likely that the absence of such a warranty
would have an effect upon the buyer's desire to purchase the
goods.
The second way to disclaim a title warranty is under circum-
stances which would give the purchaser reason to know that the
seller did not personally claim the title or that the seller was pur-
porting to sell only rightful title in his or her own, or a third
party's, interest. 46 An obvious example of this disclaimer is the
quitclaim deed, in which the seller makes a simple sales contract
stating, "I sell only those rights which I may possess." Presuma-
bly, the goods are then purchased with this understanding and the
price between the parties is set accordingly. While the Code's
comments specifically include certain categories of sellers within
this provision,47 in other cases it will be left to the trier of fact to
ascertain whether the circumstances come within the operation of
this section.
Problems with a disclaimer can arise when there has been a
mutual mistake between buyer and seller. Should the true owner
claim goods which were thought to belong to another, the buyer
would be left with no remedy if these provisions were strictly con-
strued. One solution would allow recission of the contract based
upon mutual mistake and thus would permit the buyer to recover
the purchase price paid without permitting recovery of any dam-
ages for the possible appreciation in value of the goods over the
purchase price of those goods.4E
It is clear that the ability of a seller to disclaim a title warranty
45. Id., Official Comment 6, states that the warranty of title is not subject to § 1302.29
governing disclaimers of express and implied warranties.
46. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25 (Page 1979).
47. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.25, Official Comment 6, provides:
Division (B) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors and
persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course that their
peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no personal
obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an unknown
or limited right. This division does not touch upon and leaves open all questions
of restitution arising in such cases, when a unique article so sold is reclaimed by a
third party as the rightful owner.
48. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 191.
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is not unlimited. The limits are designed to protect buyers from a
seller's overreaching, and to contribute to the creation of an effec-
tive market mechanism which may result in the lowering of sales
prices when the goods do not have a title warranty.
D. Breach of a Warranty of Title
Once a buyer has a title warranty, the focus of the inquiry
turns to the events surrounding breach of the warranty. The oc-
currence of a breach must be proved by the party asserting that
the breach has occurred. Generally, this means that once the
goods are accepted, the burden of proof falls upon the buyer.4 9
The mechanics of this proof burden raise several questions. What
are the characteristics of a breach of warranty of title? Is it neces-
sary that the buyer be both dispossessed of the goods and that the
ownership of the goods be subject to an adverse claim? Is either
sufficient, in the alternative, to create the situation where the
buyer may claim a breach of warranty of title? The Code provides
that neither dispossession of the goods by the true owner against
the buyer nor the assertion of an adverse claim to those goods is
essential to establish liability in the seller for a breach of warranty
to title. Section 1302.25 mandates that every sales contract auto-
matically include a warranty of title; consequently, the seller must
deliver to the buyer a good title for the goods sold.
When the seller delivers less than perfect title, the Code seems
to require that the warranty be treated as breached and allow re-
covery of only nominal damages. Absent evidence of greater
damages, it would probably not be worthwhile for a buyer to com-
mence such an action. A further problem arises regarding rightful
rejection and revocation because, although the Code discusses de-
fault in general terms or more specifically refers to default in a
tender of delivery or of quality,50 there are often peculiar
problems associated with a default in title which remain unan-
swered. For example, the Code allows rejection of the goods "if
the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform
to the contract."'" What constitutes nonconformity when the de-
fect is in the title? Is title an aspect of "goods" or of "tender"? It
is possible to envision a situation where the quality of the goods
and the tender of the delivery were both proper, yet the title defect
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.65(D) (Page 1979).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.86-88 (Page 1979).
51. Id. § 1302.60.
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made the goods worthless. Since the Code does not specify when
goods can be rejected or the agreement can be revoked due to a
faulty title, the impression is created that any such defect equals
"nonconformity." Thus, under these circumstances a buyer
should be able to reject the goods or revoke an acceptance. Some
courts have also treated faulty title as a failure of consideration
and have allowed recovery on that basis.52
Moreover, once a breach is established, good faith is never a
valid defense. The warranties established by section 1302.25 are
absolute; the fact that the seller had no knowledge of an outstand-
ing encumbrance at the time of the sale does not excuse liability.5 3
Furthermore, when a seller breaches a warranty of title, the buyer
has several courses of action. The buyer may always reject the
goods in question or revoke the agreement. A rejection54 occurs
when the buyer discovers the defect in title prior to delivery and
does not accept the goods. A revocation,55 on the other hand, is
the proper means of disavowing goods that have already been ac-
cepted. A revocation is permitted where there has been difficulty
in discovering the defect or where the buyer justifiably assumed
that the defect would be cured. In any case, the buyer has the
same rights and duties when revoking acceptance as there would
have been in rejecting the tendered goods. 6
In addition to providing remedies for nonconforming goods,
the Code also protects the buyer against infringement of patent
and trademark. 7 Specific provisions of the Code establish when a
breach of this warranty occurs,58 but it must be noted that there
are certain procedural requirements a buyer must meet to main-
tain a suit for damages. For example, if a third party brings suit
against the buyer for infringement, the buyer must notify or, as it
is more commonly denoted, "vouch-in" the seller of the litigation
within a reasonable time after receiving such notice.59 If the
buyer fails to do so, the seller will not be bound by the outcome of
52. See, e.g., America Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super.
322, 268 A.2d 313 (1970).
53. See Kruger v. Bibi, 3 U.C.C. REP. 1132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967).
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.60 (Page 1979).
55. Id. § 1302.66.
56. For a list of remedies available under the Code, see OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1302.85-.92 (Page 1979).
57. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.25(C) (Page 1979).
58. Id. § 1302.65.
59. Id. § 1302.65(C)(2). See Comment, Sales Law-The "Vouching in" Provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 CONN. B.J. 288 (1962).
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the litigation.6" The rationale for this requirement is that the
seller's rights are prejudiced if the opportunity to participate in an
action is denied.6" Obviously, where the action is for a breach of
warranty of title, a seller who has not been "vouched-in" does not
have the opportunity to present a case and prove that his or her
title is paramount to that of the third party who sued the buyer.
If, however, the seller is notified of the suit, but fails to join it, then
he or she will be bound by any determination of common fact.62
If the action is one pursuant to section 1302.25 and the buyer
does not demand that the seller come in to defend, the seller may
intervene and take control of the litigation.63 The buyer, however,
will not be barred from obtaining remedies unless the seller bears
the expense of the litigation and agrees to satisfy all judgments, or
unless the buyer refuses to yield the litigation to the seller. 6
A different situation is presented when a third party sues the
seller for infringement, and the goods had been made according to
the buyer's specification.65 In this situation, the seller must notify
the buyer within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the
pending litigation. Failure to give notice, or undue delay, may
bar the seller's remedy against the buyer.66 Also, if the seller asks
the buyer to come in and defend and the buyer declines, the buyer
will be bound by the outcome of the suit. The buyer will also be
liable for the expenses incurred by the seller in defending the
suit.
67
It should be noted that compliance with these procedural re-
quirements is relatively easy. Once that compliance has been ac-
complished, the plaintiff must present evidence of the breach of
the warranty. Finally, the question of damages must be faced.
E. Damages
The aggrieved party's damage award is, of course, a question
for the trier of fact. The Code, however, sets forth the damages
available to the aggrieved party. At minimum, the successful
party will receive the price paid for the goods. Additionally, the
60. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.65(C)(2) (Page 1979).
61. See Jones v. Linebaugh, 34 Mich. App. 305, 191 N.W.2d 142 (1971).
62. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.65(E)(1) (1979).
63. Id. § 1302.65(E)(2).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 1302.65(F) (Page 1979).
66. Id. §§ 1302.65(C)(2), .65(F).
67. Id. §§ 1302.65(E)(2), .65(F).
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aggrieved party may be awarded incidential and consequential
damages. Yet, the buyer who recovers damages in a suit for an
anticipated breach of warranty of title can expect that the recovery
will be diminished by whatever expenses have been saved due to
the default of the seller.68
In a breach of warranty of title action the Code clearly pro-
vides that a plaintiff may recover damages based upon the differ-
ence in value between the goods as accepted and the goods as
warranted.6 9 Where the warranty of title is defective because of
some form of encumbrance, the buyer may be compensated by
removal of the encumbrance and reimbursement of costs incurred
in securing its removal.7"
The case of Galto v. Hoffman7" illustrates this principle. In
that case, plaintiff purchased an automobile from the defendant
for $1,460 and, after receiving the registration from the defendant,
reregistered the automobile and paid the proper fees and taxes in
full. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff received a notice from the
lending institution stating that $1,200 was due on the automobile
and unless payment was made, the car would be repossessed. The
plaintiff paid the $1,200 and sued the defendant for $1,200 in
damages caused by the breach of warranty of title. The plaintiff
argued that his warranty included title free of any lien or encum-
brance. Because the defendant had not specifically excluded or
modified this warranty, the court held that the sale was uncondi-
tional, making the encumbrance on the motor vehicle a breach of
warranty. The court determined that the measure of damages for
the breach of warranty was the amount paid by the plaintiff to
maintain quiet possession of the automobile. In addition to al-
lowing recovery of the $1,200, the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to legal fees resulting from the court action.72
The warranty of title provided by the Ohio Revised Code gives
a buyer certain rights regarding his or her ability to know that
goods bought may be used in any way the buyer wishes. Changes
from prior law have abolished some arbitrary distinctions which
formerly existed, but have also imposed certain procedural re-
quirements in some situations. Although the title warranty is
68. Id. § 1302.87(A).
69. Id. § 1302.88(B).
70. Seymour v. W.S. Boyd Sales Co., 257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962).
71. 5 U.C.C. REP. 1056 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
72. Id. at 1058. The assessment of damages for legal fees was expected to be the
determination of the reasonable value of the plaintiffs attorney's fees. Id. at 1059.
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often overlooked, the Code provides that it is present in every con-
tract of sale. The Code also provides for a second type of war-
ranty-a warranty of quality-which will be examined in the next
section of this Article.
II. EXPRESS WARRANTIES BY AFFIRMATION, PROMISE,
DESCRIPTION, AND SAMPLE
In addition to the warranty of title, the Uniform Commercial
Code provides for warranties that deal with the general or specific
quality of the goods sold. The important elements of such a war-
ranty are that the seller must express it as a statement of fact and
must specifically represent it as a quality of the goods which the
buyer is induced to purchase.73
A. Creation of an Express Warranty
Although the express warranty provision under the Code is
substantially the same as that under the Uniform Sales Act,74
there are important differences. Perhaps the most significant
change in the Code provisions was the elimination of the require-
ment that the buyer must rely on the seller's representations. In-
73. This discussion does not take into account warranties that are implied by law.
These will be treated in a later section.
74. The Code addresses express warranties in § 1302.26 which states:
(A) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(1) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
(2) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(3) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
(B) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.26 (Page 1979). The section in the Uniform Sales Act ad-
dressing express warranties was found at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.13 (Page 1952)
(repealed 1962), which states:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to in-
duce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods rely-
ing thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.
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stead, the Code substitutes the requirement that an express
warranty must be made as a "part of the basis of the bargain."
Under the "reliance" test, there was a temptation to give the lan-
guage greater meaning than it was entitled to. The reliance test
also placed on the buyer the burden of establishing reliance.
Under the Code, however, the essential ingredient for the creation
of an express warranty is that the seller's affirmation, promise,
description, sample, or model become "part of the basis of the
bargain."" Unfortunately, the Code does not define "basis of the
bargain." Moreover, it is not apparent what constitutes a "basis,"
nor how significant a part it must play in the creation of an ex-
press warranty. The Code gives only a general impression of what
is meant by that phrase, leaving it to the courts to arrive at a
case-by-case definition. Given the extreme variance of the fac-
tual situations present in the cases, a hard and fast definition
might prove to be inadequate. In essence, the most important fac-
tor is whether the seller's statements were regarded by the buyer
as part of the reason for purchasing the goods.
As a result of this new emphasis, the term "bargain" assumes a
meaning different from that which surrounded pre-Code con-
tracts. As one author noted, a "bargain" cannot be said to have
occurred at a fixed point in time nor is a bargain inflexible as to its
contents; rather, a "bargain" is a relationship between the parties
to the transaction which is commercial in nature and focuses upon
a particular product.76 This commercial relationship terminates
only when the bargain has been struck between the parties to the
transaction and there is nothing left for either party to perform on
that bargain. Therefore, "bargain" might include the stream of
activity in the creation of a contract commencing with the initial
negotiations between the parties, advancing through the offer and
acceptance, and terminating when all the rights, duties, and obli-
gations on both sides have been performed. Hence, a bargain is
neither delineated by the words of acceptance nor limited to the
precise moment that such words are uttered. The sole concern of
the parties is whether the seller's language, or the exhibition of
samples or models, is to be regarded as part of the basis of the
bargain.77
As a result of the basis of the bargain test, the Code has almost
eliminated the requirement of reliance by the buyer on the seller's
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(A).
76. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 206.
77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26, Official Comment 7 (Page 1979).
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statements. "In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during the bargain are regarded as part of
the description of those goods; hence, no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement.""8 The element of reliance, however,
may still be important in showing that an affirmation or descrip-
tion was part of the basis of the bargain.
Notwithstanding the significance of "basis of the bargain" on
the creation of a warranty, if the buyer has actual knowledge that
a statement made by the seller is false, the buyer cannot claim to
have relied upon the seller's statement and is precluded from es-
tablishing that a warranty arose between the parties concerning
the subject matter of the sale. It is clear that a statement the buyer
knows to be false cannot be the basis of the bargain.79 Of course,
where the seller has made a false statement, the possibility still
remains that the buyer will have a cause of action for fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation. One court stated:
There is a definite distinction between a fraudulent representa-
tion and a warranty. A fraudulent representation is an antece-
dent statement made as an inducement to the contract, but is
not a part or element of the contract. On the other hand, to
constitute an express warranty, the statement must be part of
the contract.80
In those situations where the seller has made a representation
after the confirmation of the sale, it would appear that the buyer
could not have relied on the seller's statement, nor could it have
been the basis of the bargain. It may be possible, however, that a
statement made after an agreement, although not a warranty, may
be binding as a modification to the original contract. Since no
consideration is required for the modification of the sales con-
tract,8 I it is merely a question of the intention of the parties
whether a statement made after the sale is "agreed" upon as a
term of the contract and thereby becomes a "warranty." In other
words, the time at which the statement or promise relating to the
78. Id., Official Comment 3.
79. City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 U.C.C. REP. 461 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
80. A.A. Baxter Corp. v. Colt Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 144, 154, 88 Cal. Rptr. 842,
848 (1970), citing Griswold v. Morrison, 53 Cal. App. 93, 99, 200 P. 62, 65 (1921).
81. OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.12(A) (Page 1979) provides: "An agreement modi-
fying a contract within sections 1302.01 to 1302.98 inclusive, of the Revised Code, needs no
consideration to the binding."
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goods is made is immaterial so long as it is done before the agree-
ment of the parties is fully performed.
At first glance, this result may seem inconsistent with the basis
of the bargain criterion of an express warranty. If the conduct
relied upon to create the warranty precedes the transaction or is
contemporaneous with the transaction, it is apparent that it can
become part of the "agreement" 2 made by the parties. If the con-
duct creating the alleged warranty occurs afterwards, it is clearly
not a part of the basis of the bargain as originally made, but may
take effect as a modification of the original bargain. 3 That is to
say, "when the express warranty is made following the original
agreement of the parties, the requirement that the warranty be a
part of the basis of the bargain is satisfied by viewing the original
agreement as modified by the express warranty ... "
In summary, section 1302.26 deals with the seller's affirmation
of fact, the description of the goods, sale by sample or model, and
any other part of the transaction between the buyer and the seller
which results in the creation of a contract. The seller need not
have any specific intention during the making of the transaction to
create a warranty,8 5 so long as any of the factors governing the
creation of the contract are made part of the basis of the bargain
by the parties to that transaction.
B. Affirmation of Fact or Promise
The Code purposely treats both affirmations of fact and
promises made by the seller to the buyer as equivalent concepts.86
By using this approach, the Code avoids the recurring problem of
determining whether an action is more appropriately founded in
tort or in contract. Cases are replete with entangled, arbitrary
classifications that too often dispense little justice. Thus, the Code
rejects any attempt to distinguish between tortious or contractual
82. Id. Section 1302.01 Official Comment 3 discusses "agreement" as "intended to
include full recognition of usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance and the
surrounding circumstances as effective parts thereof, and any agreement permitted under
the provisions of this Act to displace a stated rule of law." The agreement (§ 1301.01(C)) is
the bargain of the parties, while the contract (§ 1301.01(K)) is the total legal obligation of
the parties that results from the agreement.
83. Id. § 1302.12(A).
84. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, § 2-313:10.
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(B). Prior Ohio law was in accord; see Compton
v. M. O'Neil Co., 101 Ohio App. 378, 139 N.E.2d 635 (1955).
86. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(A)(1) (Page 1979).
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liability insofar as a definition of an affirmation of fact or promise
is concerned.
The important problem which arises under this section con-
cerns the distinction between an affirmation of fact or promise and
mere sales talk or puting. Over the years, the definition of express
warranties has become more inclusive. Early on, the courts inter-
preted warranties strictly and often considered the language of the
seller as mere puffing. Under the Uniform Sales Act, and now
under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, there is a trend
toward considering the seller's statements as an expression of a
warranty. Despite this trend, there remain limitations upon what
an express warranty includes. These restraints are clearly set forth
in section 1302.26(B) which provides that neither the formal
words of "guarantee" or "warranty," nor the seller's specific intent
to create an express warranty are necessary for the creation of an
express warranty.8 7 However, almost as if to retract the statement,
the Code continues: "an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
of commendation of the goods does not create a warranty."' 8 The
language of section 1302.26(B) is remarkably similar to that of the
Uniform Sales Act section 12 which provided: "[N]o affirmation
of the value of the good, nor any statement purporting to be a
statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a war-
ranty. 8
9
By substituting the word "merely" for the word "only" as used
in the Uniform Sales Act, the drafters of the Code apparently at-
tempted to delimit the scope of the seller's puffing. Thus, "an af-
firmation merely of the value of goods" would not create a
warranty under the Code. In this respect, the Code adopts pre-
Code law.90 Given the statutory mandate to construe the Code
liberally,9' it seems possible that courts will eventually create an
exception to the Code's language and make the seller's statement
of value part of the basis of the bargain.
The Code term "commendation," however, will create many
problems. For example, a pharmacist who sells a packaged drug
87. Prior law in accord; see Compton v. O'Neil Co., 101 Ohio App. 378, 139 N.E.2d
635 (1955) (technical or particular words or forms of expression are not necessary to create
an express warranty, and the word "warrant" or "warranty" need not be used. A warranty
need not be in writing or made in specific terms).
88. OHIo RFv. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(B) (Page 1979).
89. Osno Rv. CODE ANN. § 1315.13 (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
90. 67 AM. JUR. 2d Sales §§ 555-556 (1973).
91. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1301.02 (Page 1979).
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and makes an affirmation of fact concerning the item has created
an express warranty. 92 It is impossible to isolate any strict criteria
which will help to distinguish value, opinion, or commendation
from an affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer. Consequently, a determination must be made on a case-
by-case basis as to which words constitute a warranty and which
do not. On the one hand, words such as "very nice" and "very
natural" when used in reference to hair dye have been held to
constitute insufficient evidence of an express warranty. 93 A simi-
lar result was reached where a distributor of clothes dryers com-
mented that "we think" the parts "might" solve your problem.
94
Likewise, neither a statement that a trailer was built to "last a
lifetime and be in perfect condition," 95 nor a manufacturer's pam-
phiet stating that the prescribed contraceptive pills were "virtu-
ally" 100 percent effective 96 created an express warranty.
On the other hand, a manufacturer of aluminum folding
chairs, who stated in an advertisement that the chairs were
"designed and constructed to match all competition. Priced to
build traffic, big volume sales and profit. A 'regular-size'
chair-smart in appearance, sturdily constructed with all the im-
portant Shott features which make it lightweight, durable, roomy
and comfortable," was held liable for breach of express warranty
when one of his chairs collapsed under the weight of a 180 pound
man.97 Similarly, an Ohio Municipal Court in Society Nat'l Bank
v. Pemberton,98 concluded that an express warranty was created
when a motor vehicle salesman "unequivocally and specifically"
told the plaintiff-buyer that a used truck was "just right for plow-
ing snow," was a one-owner vehicle, and was in good shape after
92. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967).
93. Carpenter v. Alberto Culver Co., 28 Mich. App. 399, 399-400, 184 N.W.2d 547,
547-48 (1970).
94. Hupp Corp. v. Metered Washer Serv., 256 Or. 245, 247, 472 P.2d 816, 818 (1970).
95. Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 393, 186 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1972)
(the language used by the seller, "if used in negotiating a sale, is ordinarily regarded as an
expression of opinion in 'the puffing of his wares' ").
96. Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98, 100 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (constru-
ing "virtually" to mean almost entirely effective and not absolutely effective).
97. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Balcrank, Inc., 175 Ohio St. 267, 268, 193 N.E.2d 920, 922
(1963).
98. 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 28 (1979) a§'d No. 9502 (9th Dist. Ct. App. Oh., 1980). The
court noted that these statements "clearly" went beyond puffing or "mere 'sales talk'."




having been serviced and inspected by a mechanic who special-
ized in the servicing of used trucks for resale.
As indicated by the preceding examples, the seller's puffing is
permissible so long as it is merely an expression of opinion.9 9 The
rationale is that a seller must be permitted a certain amount of
flexibility to sell goods. The critical question remaining is just
what amount of flexibility does the seller have? Unfortunately,
the degree of permissible puffing is not clear and therefore must
be established on a case-by-case basis. 1°°
Puffing need not always take the form of opinion and could
include representations made in advertisements or brochures. Be-
cause the promises or affirmations of sellers have been dissemi-
nated into the stream of commerce by the mass media, and
consumers have been led to believe the promises or affirmations of
various manufacturers, those promises should be treated as war-
ranties made by the producers of the merchandise. In Inglis v.
American Motors, 1 ' the court dealt with the problem of seller's
advertisements. The court stated:
Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals
and other media to call attention, in glowing terms, to the qual-
ities and virtues of their products, and this advertising is di-
rected at the ultimate consumer. . . . Under these
circumstances, it is highly unrealistic to limit purchaser's pro-
tection to warranties made directly to him by his immediate
seller. The protection he really needs is against the manufac-
turer whose published representations caused him to make the
purchase.' 0 2
While a concrete list of cases which clearly distinguishes between
permissible and impermissible puffing does not exist, the contin-
ued applicability of the "benefit of the bargain" test should not be
overlooked. As stated in section 1302.26, Comment 8, "the basic
question remains the same: What statements of the seller have in
the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the
basis of the bargain?"' 103 This statement is closely interwoven with
99. In Schwartz v. Gross, 93 Ohio App. 445, 114 N.E.2d 103 (1952), the court was of
the opinion that it is the seller's privilege to "puff" his goods so long as the salesmanship
remains within the range of "dealer's talk" and mere expression of opinion. The court was
interpreting OHIO REv. CODE § 1315 (1952).
100. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, § 2-313:41.
101. 30 Ohio Op. 2d 181, 197 N.E.2d 921, afl'd, 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583
(1964).
102. Id. at 184, 197 N.E.2d at 925 (quoting Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
103. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26, Official Comment 8 (Page 1979).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the court's interpretation as to what constitutes the buyer's reason-
able expectations and must be regarded as the ultimate point of
inquiry.
C. Descriptions
Although section 14 of the Uniform Sales Act provided that
descriptions created implied warranties protecting the buyer,' °4
the Uniform Commercial Code made a description of goods an
express warranty, stating "any description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description."105 By making a
description an express warranty, the Code avoids problems which
arose under the Uniform Sales Act. The Code makes it unneces-
sary for the trier of fact to distinguish between a set of promises or
affirmations of fact and a description by the seller. Most impor-
tantly, it changes the pre-Code practice of permitting an effective
disclaimer of an implied warranty of description. Thus, if the
seller disclaims all implied warranties, under the Code such a dis-
claimer cannot have any effect upon the express warranties, re-
gardless of whether the express warranty came by way of
description or affirmation of fact.10 6
The express warranty which arises from a description of the
goods is of great importance because parties almost always in-
clude a description of the goods which are to be the subject matter
of the contract. Since the warranty is express, a seller will not be
able to disclaim it through the use of a general disclaimer of im-
plied warranties. In cases where a seller attempts to disclaim both
implied and express warranties, 07 the Code protects the reason-
able or justified expectations of the consumer, 0 8 and refuses to
give the disclaimer effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with
the express warranty.109 As one author stated:
104. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.15 (Page 1952) (repealed 1962); see also Phillips v.
Sharp, 44 Ohio App. 311, 185 N.E. 562 (1932).
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(A)(2) (Page 1979).
106. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 220-21.
107. The formula, JP = DW, may very well illustrate this trend away from caveat
emptor: judicial protection (JP) of the buyer is equal to the seller's disclaimers of warran-
ties (DW) in order to give effect to the buyer's reasonable expectations in the transaction.
108. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1301.01(S), .15 (Page 1979). These sections seem to
indicate that good faith, fair dealing, and honesty in fact are the Code's rairon d'eire.
109. See, e.g., Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 29 (1979), afld No.
9502 (9th Dist. Ct. App. Oh. 1980). The court stated that the "disclaimer provisions in the
sales contract and warranty document are hopelessly inconsistent with [the salesman's] oral
express warranties." Therefore, the "latter must predominate." Id.
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The buyer can quite properly assume that any disclaimer in the
writing does not mean that the buyer will not receive the goods
which he ordered. It is reasonable for him to believe that he is
entitled to the described goods, and that the seller cannot per-
form his agreement by shipping something different--even
though there is a disclaimer of express warranties. The Code
protects this justified expectation of the buyer.1 '
It is important to note that section 1302.26(A)(1) of the Code
speaks of an atrmation of fact or promise as a statement made by
the "seller to the buyer," while in section 1302.26(A)(2) the Code
does not by its terms require that the statement be made by the
seller to the buyer. Thus, to fall within the scope of section
1302.26(A)(2) a buyer need only describe the goods to be
purchased. The result is the same whether the description is as
detailed as a blueprint or a specification, or as informal as an or-
der to deliver the same goods that have always been delivered.'
Where the blueprints or specifications are submitted by the buyer,
however, the seller is not always liable for the ultimate use or non-
use of the goods. One such instance where no liability attached
involved holiday boxes for liquor which proved unusable because
of faulty specifications supplied to the seller by the buyer.' 1 2 Even
though this exception to the description as express warranty rule
exists, buyers will find that the often overlooked description war-
ranty is an important means of obtaining goods of bargained-for
quality.
D. Sale or Sample
In addition to express warranties by description, any sample or
model made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
110. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 221.
111. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.26, Official Comment 5, discusses the "description"
section:
Division (A)(2) makes specific some of the principles set forth above when a
description of the goods is given by the seller.
A description need not be by words. Technical specifications, blueprints and
the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if made part of
the basis of the bargain goods must conform with them. Past deliveries may set
the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by course of dealing. Of
course, all descriptions by merchants must be read against the applicable trade
usages with the general rules as to merchantability resolving any doubts.
See, e.g., Farmers Union Coop. Gin v. Smith, 9 U.C.C. REP. 823 (Ct. App. Okla. 1971)
(written description on seed bags created an express warranty); Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co.,
246 Cal App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966) (description of seed type known in the trade
and to the parties).
112. Standard Packaging Corp. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 259 F. Supp. 919 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), a~fd, 378 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1967).
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warranty that all of the goods will conform to the sample or
model. 11 3 As with the preceding discussion of description, it is
unnecessary that the sample or model be offered to the buyer by
the seller to create an express warranty. Because samples or mod-
els do not create implied warranties as they did under the Uni-
form Sales Act section 114, the Code avoids the problem with
general disclaimers of implied warranties which arose under the
Uniform Sales Act when they were considered to be an implied
warranty. 1 4 Although it is unnecessary to make a distinction be-
tween a sample and a model for the purposes of section
1302.26(A)(3), the Comments indicate that a sample and a model
are not the same.1" 5 The distinction is of little practical impor-
tance, however, because the remedies would be the same in the
event of a breach of warranty.
In order for this warranty to arise, the sample or model must
be a part of the basis of the bargain. This prerequisite means that
113. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(A)(3) (Page 1979).
114. Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.17 (Page 1952) (repealed 1962) provided:
In the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample:
(A) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall correspond with the
sample in quality.
(B) There is an implied warranty that the buyer shall have a reasonable
opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample, except as otherwise pro-
vided in sections 1315.01 to 1315.76, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
(C) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind, there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be free from any defect, rendering them un-
merchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of
the sample.
115. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.26(A)(e), Comment 6, provides:
The basic situation as to statements affecting the true essence of the bargain is
no different when a sample or model is involved in the transaction. This section
includes both a "sample" actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the
subject matter of the sale, and a "model" which is offered for inspection when the
subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the bulk of the
goods.
Although the underlying principles are unchanged, the facts are often ambigu-
ous when something is shown as illustrative, rather than as a straight sample. In
general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any affirmation of
fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain. But there is no escape from the
question of fact. When the seller exhibits a sample purporting to be drawn from
an existing bulk, good faith of course requires that the sample be fairly drawn.
But in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a "sample" does not of itself
show whether it is merely intended to "suggest" or to "be" the character of the
subject-matter of the contract. The question is whether the seller has so acted
with reference to the sample as to make him responsible that the whole shall have
at least the values shown by it. The circumstances aid in answering this question.
If the sample has been drawn from an existing bulk, it must be regarded as
describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompanied by an un-
mistakable denial of such responsibility. If, on the other hand, a model of mer-
chandise not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption that it has become a
literal description of the subject matter is not so strong, and particularly so if
modification on the buyer's initiative impairs any feature of the model.
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the buyer can reasonably expect, and does reasonably believe, that
the items to be delivered will conform to the sample or the model.
For example, even though a model is smaller than the actual size
of the goods, this fact does not prevent the creation of a warranty
that the goods will conform to the buyer's reasonable expectation
of size.
There is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes conform-
ity. Whether a buyer's expectations that the goods will conform
precisely to the sample is a question of fact. It is perhaps more
likely that a sample will create an expectation that the goods will
conform only in a general sense rather than conform exactly to the
sample offered. 1 6 In Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans Holterbosch,
Inc. ,I7 the jury determined whether the value of the whole con-
tract was substantially impaired when the delivery of food to a
restaurant at the New York World's Fair was not in conformity
with the sample that had been provided.'
1 8
Since a seller and buyer do not ordinarily enter into a contract
based entirely on either a sample or model, affirmations of fact,
promises, or descriptions made by the seller to the buyer are also
relevant in determining whether a warranty has been created. Not
surprisingly, inconsistencies among these different representations
may arise. To resolve these conflicts, the drafters of the Code in-
cluded section 1302.30, which provides that whenever reasonable,
the warranties created by the different representations are to be
construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative in ef-
fect. When the different representations cannot reasonably be
construed as being consistent with one another, then section
1302.30 provides that "the intention of the parties shall determine
which warranty is dominant." Section 1302.30 also establishes
three rules which are applicable in ascertaining the parties' inten-
tions." 9
Once a sample or model becomes part of the basis of the bar-
116. Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App. 653, 177 S.E.2d 428
(1970) (finding an express warranty in the seller's assurance to the buyer that a different
model of radio was as good as or, "if anything," better than those previously requested).
117. 101 N.J. Super. 61, 243 A.2d 253 (1968).
118. Note that whenever there is a nonconformity, the seller must be given the appro-
priate notice of nonconformity and an opportunity to cure the defect. OHmo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1302.52 (Page 1979).
119. First, any exact or technical specification displaces an inconsistent sample or
model or general language of description. Second, a sample from an existing bulk dis-
places inconsistent general language of description. Third, express warranties are domi-
nant over all implied warranties except for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.30 (Page 1979).
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gain and an express warranty arises, partially conforming goods
can cause problems. Section 1302.26(A)(1) states that an affirma-
tion of fact or promise which creates an express warranty means
that the "goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise."
Subsection (2) states that any description of the goods which cre-
ates an express warranty is a warranty that the "goods shall con-
form to the description." Subsection (3), however, provides that
any sample or model creates an express warranty that the "whole
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model." The other
subsections clearly do not insist that all of the goods in a shipment
conform to the goods ordered. Obviously, if one were to construe
the provisions of subsection (c) strictly, then one tomato appearing
in a shipment of catsup would constitute a sufficient nonconform-
ity for the buyer to reject the entire shipload of catsup. Such a
strict construction would push these terms to their most absurd
conclusion. A nonconformity that affects the entire shipload of
goods presents the easy situation, but it is unclear when the mere
dissimilarity between the model or sample shown and the goods
delivered creates an outright breach as opposed to an inconse-
quential nonconformity.
One way to resolve some of these problems would be to em-
ploy sections 1302.27 120 and 1302.28 121 wherever there is a par-
tially conforming shipment. In one instance, a court held that
something more than conformity to the sample--"fitness for the
purpose intended and merchantability"-is required. 22 The
court reasoned that when the seller submits a sample to the buyer
to induce the purchase of the goods and it forms a part of the basis
of the bargain, the seller's actions create both an express warranty
that the goods will conform to the sample, and an implied war-
ranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.2
No matter what type of bargaining the parties to the transaction
engage in, so long as it culminates in the creation of a contract,
these warranties exist. Another possible solution bypasses the
question of implied warranties altogether and construes the sam-
ple as including not only a warranty that the physical features of
the goods delivered will conform to those of the sample or model,
but also a warranty that the goods delivered will operate in the
same manner as the sample or model.
120. Warranty of Merchantability.
121. Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose.
122. Loomis Bros. Corp. v. Queen, 46 Del. Co. 79, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 482 (1958).
123. Id. at 80, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d at 484.
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The express warranty by sample or model will usually be of
little utility to ordinary consumers. Such a warranty does exist,
however, and like the issues concerning the effect of a buyer's in-
spection of the goods-to be explored in the next section-it mer-
its discussion.
E. Inspection
Other warranty questions involving nonconformity can arise
when a buyer inspects the goods and subsequently buys them. Do
the seller's representations concerning the goods sold to the buyer
become part of the basis of the bargain? Has the buyer's inspec-
tion of the goods prior to the purchase acted as a waiver of the
warranty created by the seller's affirmation of fact, promise,
description, sample or model? Perhaps the best answer to these
questions can be formulated from a careful analysis of the trans-
action which resulted in the buyer's inspection and subsequent
purchase of the goods.
The Code provides that an implied warranty will be negated
when the buyer ought to have discovered the defect complained
about.'2 4 There is, however, no express reference made in the
Code regarding the effect of a buyer's inspection or examination
on express warranties. Therefore, regardless of whether the buyer
inspects or examines the goods, there is no automatic exclusion of
express warranties. l25 This rationale was affirmed in GeneralElec-
tric Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc. 26 where the court held
that an express warranty imposes liability upon the seller, and that
liability cannot be offset merely by the inspection of the goods by
the buyer."2 7 Similarly, where an action is based upon an express
warranty, the mere failure by the buyer to inspect the product or
to discover a defect does not ordinarily bar a cause of action
against the seller.'28 Even after a demonstration, an express war-
ranty will be included as part of the basis of the bargain so long as
124. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C)(2) (Page 1979) (an examination of the
goods or failure to examine the goods precludes the creation of an implied warranty with
respect to defects discovered or defects that ought to have been discovered).
125. See, eg., Union Pipe & Mach., Ltd. v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 225 F.2d 829
(6th Cir. 1955). For more detailed suggestions regarding this problem, see generally R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 226-27.
126. 403 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1968).
127. Id. at 935.
128. Bracknett v. Johnson, 29 Conn. Supp. 104, 273 A.2d 499 (1970) (buyer sued the
retailer for breach of warranty when he received personal injuries while attempting to cor-
rect a defect in his snowblower).
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the defect is not actually discovered during that inspection. 129
Yet, where the buyer has performed a thorough inspection, has
a working knowledge of the product to be purchased, and is actu-
ally aware of the defects prior to the purchase, a seller's statement
that the goods are in "good condition" does not create an express
warranty. 30  Similarly, no warranty based on affirmations,
promises, descriptions, or samples will arise where the buyer has
examined the goods prior to their delivery and has relied solely
upon his or her own skill and judgment in making the examina-
tion. In this situation, any patent defects which should have been
obvious to the buyer, but which actually went unnoticed would
effect an exclusion of implied warranties.13 '
F. Proving the Existence of an Express Warranty
The Code provisions creating these warranties are of little
value, unless the buyer can prove that those statements were made
in a particular case. A situation will often arise where the-seller
will deny making an express warranty prior to the sale. When
such a problem does arise, it will usually involve any combination
of the following concepts: statute of frauds; parol evidence rule; a
determination of whether a seller's promise, affirmation of fact,
sample, model, or description was in fact a basis of the bargain;
statute of limitations; lack of privity; or contributory negligence.
The statute of frauds should present no practical problem in this
particular type of case, since all that need be shown is that there is
some writing which sets forth the quantity of goods bought and
sold and that the writing is sufficient to indicate that the parties to
the transaction had entered into a contract of sale.132
The greatest obstacle for the buyer seeking to prove that a war-
ranty existed prior to the making of the sale, is the parol evidence
rule. This rule provides that if a writing is intended by the parties
as their full, final expression of agreement, the terms of that con-
tract cannot be contradicted, modified, altered or changed by evi-
dence of any prior or contemporaneous oral agreement between
129. Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 264,
254 N.E.2d 542 (1969) (used crane failed to work as warranted after it performed accepta-
bly in a demonstration). A contrary result would occur when there is a thorough and
complete inspection of those goods at the time of the demonstration.
130. Janssen v. Hook, 1 M. App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971) (oral agreement did not
create a warranty where the purchaser had a working knowledge of the goods).
131. Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1
(1967).
132. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.04 (Page 1979).
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the parties. 33 The rule, however, does permit the admission into
evidence of any fact which may explain or supplement the terms
of the contract.1 34 Thus, information such as custom or usage of
the trade and consistent terms are admissible unless the writing
literally was intended as the complete and exclusive agreement be-
tween the parties. Following these principles, a recent case held
that where the parties to the contract agreed to a written notation
concerning a "30 day warranty," evidence of that warranty was
not inconsistent with the contract when the total contract was con-
sidered. Therefore, parol evidence was admissible to explain the
term. 135
Despite the buyer's problems in satisfying the parol evidence
rule, courts are often reluctant to construe the rule in a manner
which would leave the buyer without remedy by effectively elimi-
nating the cause of action. In an effort to do justice, courts will
engage in judicial gymnastics which permit them to determine
whether the writing was the full and final expression of both par-
ties. Usually, though, the courts do not adequately explain how
they reach these holdings. 136
As in most factual determinations, no single aspect of the con-
tract will determine the final intention of the parties. Conscion-
ability137 and good faith 138 are two additional factors which are
useful in determining whether a warranty was given. Obviously,
if the contract is a product of fraud, oppression, lack of
knowledge, or any other circumstances which would tend to indi-
cate that the buyer did not assent to the clause or the contract, it
cannot be considered to be a full and final expression of the intent
of both the parties to the transaction. Therefore, evidence of this
sort can be admitted to prove or disprove the warranty. "In short,
under the Code the finality of a writing cannot be determined
solely by looking at the writing; the background of the negotia-
tions and of the execution of the document is relevant evidence to
133. KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971), a f'din
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Omio Rv.
CODE ANN. § 1302.05 (Page 1979).
134. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.05 (Page 1979). See Centennial Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 346 N.E.2d 330 (1975) (the court allowed a
written express warranty to be supplemented and explained by oral express warranty since
the writing between the parties was not intended as a final expression of their agreement).
135. Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1967).
136. See, eg., Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).
137. OHio RV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (Page 1979).
138. Id. § 1301.09. See also Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897
(1974), regarding the interplay between good faith and the parol evidence rule.
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determine the parties' intention."' 39 In some cases, parol evidence
might be admissible to indicate the existence of an implied war-
ranty, while the same evidence could not be used to indicate the
existence of an express warranty. 4 °
The fundamental test for the existence of an express warranty
is constant; there must be evidence that the seller's representations
constitute a part of the basis of the bargain. Thus, a court must
consider the foundation of the agreement between the parties and
scrutinize the writing itself. When a breach of warranty is pleaded
as an affirmative defense, the defendant must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a warranty exists and that a breach
occurred. 41 The fact that a seller of goods performs with honesty
in fact and made statements concerning the goods without knowl-
edge of the falsity of these statements does not constitute a defense
if an express warranty has been made and breached.
Express warranties regarding the quality of goods are impor-
tant weapons in the buyer's arsenal. Such warranties are not,
however, the totality of the Code's protection of buyers. The next
section of the Article discusses the implied warranties provided for
by the Ohio Revised Code-warranties that are often of greater
and more widespread utility to ordinary consumers.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
As mentioned in previous sections, legal rules have developed
to counterbalance the doctrine of caveat emptor. The duties im-
posed on sellers by these rules are based on either express repre-
sentations made by the seller to the buyer or on obligations which
arise by operation of law. This latter form of protection is called
an implied warranty.
Regardless of what the affirmative intention of the parties to
the transaction may be, a warranty implied by operation of law
automatically becomes part of the contract at the time the contract
139. R. NORDSTROM, sunpra note 24, at 216.
140. See, e.g., In re Reaves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (Armed Servs. Bd. of
Contract App. 1946).
141. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Smith, 109 Ill. App. 2d 91, 248 N.E.2d 310 (1969) (abstract
of the decision). In order for the buyer to recover against the seller he must show that the
seller's representations of fact, in which the goods producing the injury were described,
formed the basis of the bargain. The buyer must show action on that representation, that
the product was defective at the time of the sale, that the defect made the product unrea-
sonably dangerous, and that the defect produced the injury. See also Speed Fasteners, Inc.
v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
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is created. 142 The doctrine of implied warranty is intended to pro-
mote the highest possible standards of business conduct by en-
couraging business transactions in which parties may find mutual
benefit through their negotiations and agreements. 143 The implied
warranty is most effective when liberally construed on behalf of
the buyer'" and administered consistently in a manner fair to all
parties to the transaction. 145 As contemplated by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, implied warranties impose a mini-
mum standard on contracts for the sale of goods.1 4 6
A. Distinctions Between Express and Implied Warranties
A useful starting point in the analysis of implied warranties is
a comparison to express warranties. As Comment 1 to section
1302.26 indicates, express warranties rest upon the "dickered" as-
pects of the transaction between the parties and become part of
the basis of the bargain. Implied warranties, however, are based
upon common factual situations or conditions which give rise to
the creation of a warranty regardless of the particular language
existing between the parties. Because in most cases neither the
express warranty nor the implied warranty produces a better re-
sult for the purchaser, neither should automatically be considered
as superior to the other. If an express warranty is found, however,
there will usually be no need to establish the existence of an im-
plied warranty. The remedies for the buyer, whether the action is
based on an implied warranty or on an express warranty, will be
the same. Both the implied and express warranty can co-exist
within the same contract, even though an express warranty may
appear to be all-inclusive. 47
Given this close similarity, a question arises as to why the dis-
142. Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284 Minn. 143, 155-56, 170 N.W.2d 72, 80
(1969).
143. Asbestos Prods., Inc. v. Ryan Landscape Supply Co., 282 Minn. 178, 180, 163
N.W.2d 767, 769 (1968).
144. Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217
(1970) (defective motorboat breached the implied warranty of merchantability).
145. Jacobson v. Broadway Motors, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App. 1968).
146. Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969).
147. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.30 (Page 1979) provides in part: "Warranties
whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumula-
tive, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine
which warranty is dominant." See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co.,
326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo. 1971), rev'don other grounds sub nom. L.D. Schreiber Cheese
Co. v. Standard Milk Co., 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972) (Missouri law permits coexistence
of implied and express warranties).
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tinction between express and implied warranties exists. The dis-
tinction in terminology may well have arisen as a result of some
historical accident in common law forms of pleading several cen-
turies ago. 148 Regardless of how it arose, in light of section
1302.29, there appears to be good reason to retain the distinction.
Significantly, express warranties arise out of some specific conduct
on the part of the seller, while implied warranties arise automati-
cally because of the seller's status as a merchant or because of the
seller's actual knowledge about the buyer's particular needs. One
author has summarized the situation and stated:
In short, the [Uniform Commercial Code] rests on the assump-
tion that implied warranties are less apt to create specific im-
pressions in the mind of the reasonable buyer than are express
warranties where, for example, the seller has asserted a fact
about the goods he is selling. Once this assumption is made,
the next step comes easily. The disclaimer of the implied war-
ranty does not call for language as specific as does the at-
tempted disclaimer of the express warranty. The [Uniform
Commercial Code] takes the step because it allows implied
warranties to be disclaimed with comparatively little difficulty,
but makes it extremely difficult to disclaim express warran-
ties. 149
In short, the distinction persists because some of the consequences
attendant to the two types of warranties are different. The next
section explores the legal ramifications of one type of implied war-
ranty-the implied warranty of merchantability.
B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
An implied warranty of merchantability is a concept imposed
by law which relates to the overall quality of the goods sold rather
than their conformity to any specific purpose for which they were
intended.150 The warranty is not a mandate of absolute perfection
in a product; since consumers do not reasonably expect perfection
in a product, the law does not automatically require it. In essence,
the term "merchantable" means that the goods will conform to
ordinary standards and are of the average grade, quality, and
value of like goods which are generally sold in the stream of com-
merce. 151
148. 'S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, 275-78 (1969).
149. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 230.
150. Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 7
(1967); see W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314, Official Comment 7 (1980).
151. McAfee v. City of Garnett, 205 Kan. 269, 274, 469 P.2d 295, 300 (1970).
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1. Limitation on the Application of Section 1302.27
Section 1302.27152 of the Code defines the implied warranty of
merchantability and outlines three restrictions on its scope and
operation. Taken in the order they appear in section 1302.27(A),
the three restrictions are: the power, by negative implication, to
exclude or modify the warranty; the requirement that the seller be
a merchant; and the requirement that the contract be for the sale
of goods.
The first limitation involves a power to disclaim as noted, or
modify the implied warranty. Unlike an express warranty, 153 the
implied warranty of merchantability may be excluded or modified
by agreement of the parties.1 54 Section 1302.27(B) establishes the
minimum level of quality that the goods must have to remain
merchantable. If a higher standard of merchantability is desired
by the parties, then it should be formalized in the written contract.
Although the terms of section 1302.27 seem to allow a complete
disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability, the general require-
ment of good faith is a limit on the seller's power to dictate con-
tract terms.
1 55
A second limitation placed upon the application of section
1302.27 deals with the definition of "merchant." Section
1302.01(A)(5) defines merchant, and distinguishes between two
152. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1979) provides:
Implied Warranty; Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(A) Unless excluded or modified as provided in § 1302.29 of the Revised
Code, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the prem-
ises or elsewhere is a sale.
(B) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(2) in the case of fungible goods are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, and
(4) run, within the variations -permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quanitity, within each unit and among all units involved; and
(5) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(C) Unless excluded or modified as provided in section 1302.29 of the Re-
vised Code, other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of
trade.
153. Id. § 1302.26.
154. Id. §§ 1302.29(A), (D).
155. For discussion of disclaimers of warranties, see notes 230-314 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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types of merchants: goods merchants and skills merchants. 56
This concept of merchant is rooted in the law and is based upon
the professional status of the person who has specialized know-
ledge regarding the goods which are sold (goods merchant) or the
business practices surrounding such a sale (skills merchant).'57
Section 1302.27, however, has restricted the meaning of merchant
to a much smaller group than that defined in section
1302.01(A)(5). Not everyone engaged in business, or with special
knowledge or skill regarding the goods, is a merchant. Section
1302.27 applies only to goods merchants; a merchant making an
isolated sale of goods different from the goods he or she normally
deals with or a nonmerchant making any isolated sale of goods is
not subject to the implied warranty of merchantability.15  It
should be noted that a seller need not sell a particular kind of
goods. If the seller ordinarily sells a general line of merchandise
manufactured by the manufacturer of those particular goods, then
the merchantability warranty applies.'59
The third limitation placed on the application of this section is
that it applies only to a contract for the sale of goods. Although
the preceding statement is generally regarded as black letter law,
it has been suggested that this exclusion is unduly restrictive. This
suggestion is supported by the Code's mandate regarding liberal
construction, and its whole philosophy which calls for the trier of
fact to adjust the Code to new commercial situations. 6a Section
1302.02 states that Article 2 applies to transactions for goods, and
further, such a transaction has a far broader application in com-
merce than merely as a satellite of the law of sales. 16  As noted
156. OH IO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.01(A)(5) (Page 1979) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
157. Ormo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.01, Official Comment 4 (Page 1979). It is the spe-
cialized knowledge about either the goods or the business practices, or both, which estab-
lish a person as a merchant.
158. Id. Official Comment 3.
159. Mutual Serv. of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewage Co., 93 Ill.
App. 2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1068) (though seller did not usually sell the particular ham-
mer and bit that was involved in the litigation, he did sell a general line of merchandise
produced by that manufacturer, and this status was sufficient to find that the sale created a
warranty of merchantability).
160. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE U.C.C.
§ 7.01(2)(b) (1972).
161. See, e.g., Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
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previously, warranty provisions have on occasion been extended
to encompass areas far wider than sale transactions. 6 2 Even if a
contract is not controlled by the Code, the Code provides persua-
sive authority useful to any court in its determination when a
commercial transaction is involved.16 3
Ohio courts have tended to adopt this veiw, and have applied
sales law to traditionally nonsales transactions. In Public Finance
Corp. v. Furnitureland, Inc. 16 the court found that a security
agreement which was sold, although not a sale of goods as defined
by section 1302.01(A)(8) was within the meaning of section
1302.27. The court reasoned that any merchant of goods who, in
the regular course of business, assigned to another a security
agreement on goods sold for a valuable consideration, gave an im-
plied warranty that the agreement was merchantable. Moreover,
the court stated "Section 1302.27 of the Revised Code codified
what the law always had been with reference to the sale of any
commercial item."1 65
In Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp. , 66 plaintiff, a laborer at a
construction site, was injured when newly installed steel roofjoists
fell on him. The defendant manufactured and sold the joists and,
therefore, gave an implied warranty of fitness for the ordinary
purpose and use of the steel joists. Although the action was
brought as a products liability case, the court did not restrict the
plaintiff to negligence theory, but allowed him to proceed on the
theory of implied warranty, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant.
Even if the application of section 1302.26 is strictly construed,
such construction would not prevent the trier of fact from apply-
ing this reasoning to analogous situations. Moreover, the Code
does not expressly prohibit the extension of section 1302.26 to any
House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969), rev'don other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910,
316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970). The trial court noted:
In view of the great volume of commercial transactions which are entered into by
the device of a lease, rather than a sale, it would be anomalous if this large body
of commercial transactions were subject to different rules of law than other com-
mercial transactions which tend to the identical economic result.
59 Misc. 2d at 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
162. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
163. Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1967).
164. 17 Ohio App. 2d 213, 245 N.E.2d 740 (1969) (when a merchant of goods in the
regular course of business assigns a security agreement to a finance company for a valuable
consideration, there is an implied warranty of merchantability).
165. Id. at 215, 245 N.E.2d at 742.
166. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
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hybrid situation-which would include a lease-sale, a bailment-
sale, or a service-sale. As one court has stated, "There is no good
reason for restricting such warranties to sales." '16 7 It seems clear
that an implied warranty of merchantability may be applied to
many transactions beyond the mere sale of goods. Thus, the sub-
stantive meaning of "merchantable" becomes critical.
An Ohio court of appeals inA. TS. Laboratories, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co. recently expanded the scope of the implied warranty
of merchantability to include the third party purchase of used
goods.' The defendant sold an airplane to Freedom Field, Inc.
who, in turn, sold the airplane a year later to the plaintiff. After
experiencing difficulty with the airplane, plaintiff sued the defend-
ant for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The
court of appeals held that the defendant was liable for breach of
warranty so long as the airplane manufactured by the defendant
contained a latent defect that was undiscovered by the original
purchasers, and there was no substantial change from the condi-
tion in which it was originally sold.'6 9
2. Meaning of Merchantability
Section 1302.27(B) provides a list of minimum qualities which
the goods must possess to be merchantable. 7 ' Comment 6 of sec-
tion 1302.27 states:
Division (B) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "mer-
chantable" nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically
mentioned in the text of the statute, but arising by usage of
trade or through case law. The language used is "must be at
least such as .... and the intention is to leave open other pos-
sible attributes of merchantability."'' 7'
Therefore, section 1302.27(B) establishes only the minimum crite-
ria for merchantability. To a large extent, course of dealing, usage
of the trade, or obligations imposed by law will also determine
what is merchantable. Section 1302.27 seeks to protect the buyer's
expectations that the goods will be at least of a "fair average"
quality and not totally worthless. 72 Fitness for ordinary purposes
167. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d 769,
775 (1965).
168. 59 Ohio App. 2d 15 (1978).
169. Id. at 20, 22.
170. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B) (Page 1979). For the text of the statute, see
note 152 supra.
171. OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27, Official Comment 6 (Page 1979).
172. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B)(2) (Page 1979).
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is merely the threshold quality which the Code demands. Part of
the obligation placed on the manufacturer or the retailer is that
the goods must be honestly resalable in the normal course of busi-
ness. This obligation of merchantability extends even to the ulti-
mate consumer, since any goods which are manufactured are
likely to be used by more than a single person.' 73
The first of the six standards concerning the merchantability of
goods found in section 1302.27 is that the goods must pass without
objection in the trade. The goods delivered must be of a quality
comparable to those generally accepted in a certain line of trade
under the description or any other designation of the goods stated
in the agreement of the parties.1 74 It is clear that difficulties are
inevitable in any attempt to establish criteria for judging which
goods pass without objection in the trade. The drafters of the
Code make it clear that section 1302.27(B)(1) and (2) are to be
read together and used in an "average" quality standard which is
neither the worst nor the best, but rather a middle of the line qual-
ity.' 75 Individual products in the bulk may fluctuate in quality,
but the average must meet the minimum standard of passing with-
out objection in the trade. Any determination of what is a fair
average quality is a question of fact and thus should include con-
sideration of factors such as the actual price charged for the goods
and the existing market price at the time of the transaction be-
tween the buyer and seller.
The second minimum standard of merchantability established
by the Code refers to fungible goods. 176 Under the Code's defini-
tion of fungible goods, 177 each unit of those goods must be consis-
tent with any other unit of such goods delivered to the buyer. An
understanding of what is meant by the requirement that fungible
goods be of "fair average" quality is aided by placing it within the
173. Id., Official Comment 8.
174. Id., Official Comment 2.
175. Id.
176. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B)(2) (Page 1979).
177. Id. § 1301.01(Q) defines fungible:
"Fungible" with respect to goods or securities means goods or securities of which
any unit is by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit.
Goods which are not fungible are fungible for the purposes of chapters 1301.,
1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306., 1307., 1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code to the
extent that under a particular agreement or document unlike units are treated as
equivalents.
See generally Comment, Confusion of Fungible and Non-Fungible Goods, 17 BAYLOR L.
REv. 80 (1965).
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context of a "commercial unit."'' 18 Again, it must be noted that
fair average goods are of middle quality and, when read together
with the requirement of section 1302.27(B)(1),' 79 must be able to
pass without objection. Of course, some fluctuation in the quality
of the goods is permitted; however, goods comprised wholly, or
nearly so, of the worst quality do not deserve the designation of
"fair average." Where doubt arises as to the quality intended by
the parties, price may act as a guideline to indicate the nature and
the scope of the seller's obligations to the buyer.8 0 A buyer usu-
ally will not pay a full price for goods which have a known defect
or do not conform to the agreement of the parties.'
The third essential requirement of the implied warranty of
merchantability is that the product must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used."' 8 2 What constitutes "or-
dinary purpose" is a decision left to the trier of fact. Courts have
found, for example, that an implied warranty of merchantability
attached to the marketing and sale of a highly caustic liquid home
drain cleaner which caused an injury to a child, 8 3 to the sale of a
mobile home which did not contain the normal amount of wall
insulation,' 4 to the sale of reconditioned lockers which turned out
to have duplicate keys and locks, 85 to the sale of an insecticide
178. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.01(A)(10) (Page 1979) defines commercial unit:
"Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character
or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a
machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a
quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the
relevant market as a single whole.
See also Abbett v. Thompson, 263 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. App. 1970), affd, 290 N.E.2d 468
(1972).
179. See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text.
180. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27, Official Comment 7 (Page 1979). See also
George A. Moore & Co. v. Mathieu, 13 F.2d 747, 748 (9th Cir. 1926), cer. denied, 273 U.S.
733 (1926).
181. See, e.g., Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156
S.E.2d 1 (1967).
182. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B)(3) (Page 1979).
183. Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio), ad with remiul-
tur, 413 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
184. Potter v. Dangler Mobile Homes, 61 Ohio Misc. 14 (1977). See also Performance
Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972) (an implied warranty of
merchantability attached to the sale of a defective trailer which was to be used as a resi-
dence).
185. Towel Mach. Serv. Corp. v. American Uniform Rental, Inc., 7 U.C.C. REP. 162
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1970) ("A locker bank with locks is inherently a security device and that
security was obviously impaired with duplications in the locks").
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which caused both injury and death to the plaintiff's livestock,1 86
and to the sale of defective shoes. 87 In each instance, the goods
were held unfit for their ordinary purposes. 188
Notwithstanding the courts' interpretation of fitness for ordi-
nary purpose, where the manufacturer produces a product which
functions properly in the purpose for which that product was
designed, if the finished product is available to the purchaser with-
out any latent defects, and if the operation of that product pro-
duces no danger or peril to the purchaser or any user of those
goods, then the seller or manufacturer faces no liability based on
the implied warranty of merchantability. A manufacturer is
under no duty to make a product accident-proof, foolproof, or im-
mune from normal wear and tear; it is a normal business expecta-
tion that machinery will deteriorate during ordinary usage. It
seems obvious that the manufacturer is under no duty to guard
against any injury which may arise from defects which are mani-
fest even to those least aware of the uses of such goods, so long as
there are no latent defects. Also, the manufacturer is not an in-
surer for an injury which the consumer has sustained through mis-
use of the product. If the buyer discovers the defect and still uses
the goods or fails to examine the goods before use, such conduct is
unreasonable and should preclude recovery based on warranty. 18 9
Continued use of a good which has a known defect can be re-
garded as an intervening cause which prevents breach of warranty
claims for resulting injuries.19°
186. Holowka v. York Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 2 U.C.C. REP. 445 (Ct. Common
Pleas Pa. 1963) (rejecting defendant's argument that regardless of what happened to the
livestock there was no violation of§ 2-314(2)(c) as long as the insecticide cured the weevil
condition).
187. Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn.
1964) (plaintiffalleged a breach of express and implied warranties when a defective heel on
her new shoes caused her to fall and injure herself).
188. Likewise, courts have determined that the seller gives an implied warranty in a
variety of situations: Greco v. Buccioni Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969) (component
parts of a machine will not fail); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967) (metal rivet studs should not split where their purpose is to fasten); Hunt v. Perkins
Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967) (marine engines should not smoke exces-
sively while running); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (hair
lotion will not bum the scalp); Nederastek v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co., 415 Pa. 136, 202
A.2d 72 (1964) (shoes will not harm the feet); Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne
Legal Register Reps. 159 (Pa. 1961) (shotgun shells will not explode prematurely).
189. OHso REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Official Comment 8 (Page 1979). See also
Jones v. White Motor Corp., 61 Ohio App. 2d 162, 173 (1978).
190. Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971). In Jones v.
White Motor Corp., 61 Ohio App. 2d 162, 173 (1978), the court noted that such continued
use constitutes contributory negligence and will preclude a recovery.
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The fourth element of merchantability mandates that any
agreement between the parties to the transaction which calls for a
supply of goods of an even kind, quality, and quantity creates an
expectation that those goods will conform to the order which was
placed.' Official Comment 9 of section 1302.27 cautions that
frequently usage of trade permits "substantial variations both with
and without an allowance or an obligation to replace varying
units."'192 In Wakerman Leather Co. v. Irvin B. Foster Sportswear
Co. ,' the court held that where the buyer had received a con-
forming shipment which complied with government specifications
concerning those goods and had failed to reject them within a rea-
sonable time or within a time agreed upon between the parties,
then those goods were clearly considered merchantable within the
meaning of section 1302.27. The fact that the purchaser, upon
closer inspection of the goods, determined that he could not actu-
ally use the goods in the manner which he had originally expected
to use them, was held not to be determinative of the
merchantability of those goods. 194
Since warranty liability does not require proof of fault, a pur-
chaser of goods is entitled to the benefit of an implied warranty
when the goods prove to be defective, despite the fact that the
seller could not have discovered, prevented, or cured the particu-
lar defect in the goods. 95 The implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty protects a buyer of goods from bearing the burden of the
resultant loss when the goods, although not violating any express
guarantee or promise by the seller, do not conform to the normal
commercial standards for those particular goods. The purpose of
an implied warranty of merchantability is to hold the seller re-
sponsible for the quality of goods sold to a purchaser. The Code
does not require evidence that the defects could or should have
been discovered by the seller, but only that the goods were or were
not of a merchantable quality when delivered to the buyer.
The fifth element of merchantability concerns the adequacy of
the packaging and labeling of the goods. Some problems may
arise in the interpretation of this requirement. Section
191. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B)(4) (Page 1979).
192. Id., Official Comment 9.
193. 34 A.D.2d 594, 308 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1970).
194. Id. at 595, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
195. Eg., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967) (two thou-
sand one-day-old chicks bought from seller developed avian leukosis (bird cancer), result-
ing in the destruction of the entire flock).
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1302.27(B)(5) may require only that the packaging be "adequate,"
or that the goods conform to any higher standard of care imposed
by the contract between the parties. If strictly construed, this sec-
tion implies that the standards are established solely by the words
of the agreement. Such an interpretation, however, would then
preclude the use of this section where there has been no specific
agreement concerning the adequacy of the container, package, or
label of the goods. Perhaps a better interpretation of section
1302.27(B)(5) would be to require, in the absence of a specific
agreement between the parties, that the container or label be rea-
sonable for the goods.196
The final element of section 1302.27(B) requires that mer-
chantable goods must also conform with any promises or affirma-
tions of fact which are made by the seller on the container or label
of the goods. As previously discussed,' 97 promises or affirmations
of fact made on a label can constitute an express warranty. Sec-
tion 1302.27 includes a label as an implied warranty. Unless there
is an effective disclaimer, it makes no difference whether the war-
ranty arises from a label which is described as an express warranty
or as an implied warranty. To disclaim an implied warranty, the
seller must comply with section 1302.29(B).' 98 Comment 10 of
section 1302.27 distinguishes between the requirements that goods
be adequately contained and that goods conform to statements on
the container. The latter applies to any label or container which
makes representations even though the original contract, either by
its express terms or perhaps by usage of trade, did not require
labeling with any specific representations. The general obligation
of good faith is also relevant to this clause because an unsuspect-
ing buyer should not be placed in the position of reselling or using
goods which were delivered under false representations. Com-
ment 10 also indicates that consideration for the representations is
not necessary. 199
196. It might also be argued that the containers themselves are "goods" and must be
merchantable in their own right. See, e.g., Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624,
171 N.E.2d 293 (1961). For a more complete discussion of this argument, see generally
Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256
(1956).
197. See notes 85-103 supra and accompanying text.
198. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(B) (Page 1976) requires oral disclaimers to men-
tion merchantability specifically, and written disclaimers to mention merchantability and
be conspicuous; disclaimers of implied warranties of fitness must be in writing and conspic-
uous. For a discussion of disclaimer of warranties, see notes 230-97 infra and accompany-
ing text.
199. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27, Official Comment 10 (Page 1979).
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There are, however, some exceptions to this rule. For exam-
ple, a warranty of merchantability attaching to a label does not
generally extend to instruction manuals. When instructions are
furnished a manufacturer might warrant fitness for that particular
purpose.21° If instructions are so poorly written as to create incon-
sistencies and ambiguities, the manufacturer or seller of the goods
may have breached the duty to instruct and warn the purchaser
concerning the installation, operation, or maintenance of the
goods. Liability should be imposed only where the breach of duty
to instruct and warn the purchaser was the proximate cause of the
injury.20 1
Merchantability, as a Code concept, casts a wide net which ex-
tends the protection of implied warranties to the sale of food. For
the purposes of section 1302.27(A), "the serving for value of food
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.""2 2 The sale of food may fall within an implied warranty as
either a warranty of merchantability, °3 or perhaps a warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, when the seller knows of the
buyer's intended use of the food. 2°  Additionally, it is possible
that a sale of food could come within the scope of an express war-
ranty where there is a sale by a sample or model.20 5
The sale of food provision in section 1302.27(A) has two limi-
tations. First, it apparently refers only to a single status seller; that
is, for the buyer to be able to recover for an injury sustained be-
cause of bad food, he or she must show that the food seller was a
merchant with respect to that food. Frequently, it is extremely
difficult to ascertain whether a server of food to be consumed on
or off the premises is, in fact, a merchant with respect to the food
sold. For example, would a church sponsoring a fund-raising sup-
per come within this definition when one of its members, a profes-
200. See, e.g., Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1968)
(where a gas company provides an instruction manual for the proper installation of a
heater, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises).
201. Breitman v. General Motors Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 689, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1971).
See Seley v. G.O. Searle & Co., 15 Ohio Op. 3d 338 (1980) for a discussion on duty to
warn.
202. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(A) (Page 1979). Ohio's pre-Code law is in ac-
cord with the Code. See Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938).
203. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1979). See also Levy v. Paul, 207 Va. 100,
147 S.E.2d 722 (1966).
204. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.28 (Page 1979). See also Finocchiaro v. Ward Bak-
ing Co., 104 R.I. 5, 241 A.2d 619 (1968).
205. See, e.g., Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans Holterbosch, Inc., 101 N.J. Super. 61, 243
A.2d 253 (1968). See also notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
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sional caterer, volunteered the catering services for that particular
dinner? In Wentzel v. Berliner20 6 the court held that no warranty
of fitness of the food was created by the professional caterer be-
cause he did not have the standing of a merchant at the time he
performed his volunteer services.
A second limitation on the applicability of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability is the type of harm to the consumer
which is actionable. It seems reasonable in transactions involving
a sale of food that an implied warranty should arise on sale,
whether or not the food poses danger to the physical well-being of
the purchaser. Section 1302.27 seems consistent with this view.
Consequently, for courts to insist that inedible food is merchanta-
ble so long as it does not harm the physical well-being of the con-
sumer runs the risk of being inconsistent with the other
applications to goods contained in section 1302.27. The court in
Martel v. Duffy Mort Corp. 207 observed:
More and more of the food sold to the public comes in cans,
frozen, prepared, and even precooked ready to eat. Whole
meals can be bought all prepared, ready or almost ready to go
on the table. We do not think it a sensible use of the time of the
profession or of the bench to construct a body of law as to
which foods are of such importance that loss of enjoyment is
compensable and those which, as a matter of law, are not of
that rank. We think it sounder to permit a plaintiff who can
convince a jury that the food product he consumed was inedi-
ble and in consequence he no longer enjoys eating it, to recover
damages, including damages for loss of enjoyment, if he can
additionally convince the jury that a true loss was suffered and
that it should add a dollar amount therefor. In some cases loss
of enjoyment may be real and substantial, an injury not to be
made light of.208
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the per-
vasiveness of the implied warranty of merchantability is an impor-
tant component of the protection afforded buyers by the Ohio
Revised Code. The other implied warranty provided by the Code,
which is subject to more limitations and hence is of less wide-
spread utility, will be discussed in the next section.
C. Implied Warranty of Fitnessfor a Particular Purpose
The implied warranty of merchantability applies to goods
206. 204 So. 2d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1968).
207. 15 Mich. App. 67, 166 N.W.2d 541 (1968).
208. Id. at 74, 166 N.W.2d at 545.
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which create an expectation in the buyer that the goods will be
usable for their ordinary purposes. Section 1302.28, on the other
hand, applies to goods which are purchased for a particular pur-
pose that the seller is or should be aware of prior to the sale of the
goods to the buyer. This section contemplates that the buyer will
have a specific use for the goods peculiar to the nature of his or
her need and that the goods will suit those needs. The warranty of
merchantability clearly does not require such specificity or partic-
ularity. The Code acknowledges the distinction with the follow-
ing example: "shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking
upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular
pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains."20 9
It should be realized, however, that both of these warranties,
as well as an express warranty, often overlap. An attempt to as-
sign a particular bailiwick to each of these warranties would un-
dermine the intention of the Code, and lead to unnecessary
attempts by the trier of fact to make distinctions where no distinc-
tions should be made. It has been observed that "the particular
purpose for which a product is used can also be one of the general
or ordinary uses of the product. 21 0
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was designed
to deal with certain specific situations. Such a warranty arises as a
matter of law when the proper factual circumstances surrounding
the transaction exist. The warranty is not contractual because it
does not become part of the basis of the bargain,211 rather it might
be denominated an automatic warranty or, as one commentator
has stated, an "ipso facto" warranty.212
The first fact relevant to the existence of the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose is that the seller, at the time of
contracting, must have reason to know of any particular purpose
for which the buyer intends to use the goods.21 3 Under prior law,
it was the buyer's duty to inform the seller about the particular
purposes for which the goods were to be used. 214 The Code, how-
ever, requires only that the seller have reason to know of the
buyer's particular purpose. The seller's knowledge is ascertained
209. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.28, Official Comment 2 (Page 1979).
210. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 503 (1968). See also Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
211. See notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
212. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, § 2-315:3.
213. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.28 (Page 1979).
214. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.16(A) (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
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at the "time of contracting;" therefore any knowledge acquired by
the seller subsequent to the creation of the contract cannot be used
to provide the basis for an implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose.
The second relevant fact for the creation of the warranty is
that the buyer must have actually relied on the seller's skill and
judgment in the selection of the goods. The requirement that the
seller need not have actual knowledge of the buyer's reliance is
similar to the requirement that the seller only have reason to know
of the buyer's particular needs. It is sufficient that the seller has
reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill and
judgment. However, the buyer must have actually relied upon the
seller's skill and judgment,21 5 and failure to prove this reliance
will bar any recovery. For instance, where the buyer makes his or
her own selection of the goods, the element of reliance will be
missing.
Section 15(4) of the Uniform Sales Act provided that "in the
case of a contract to sell, or a sale of, a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty of its
fitness for any particular purpose. 216 This provision sometimes
caused serious injustice 217 and invited disputes regarding exactly
what constituted a patent or trade name.218 The Code has effec-
tively eliminated the patent or trade name exception by consider-
ing its existence as only one factor in ascertaining whether the
buyer actually relied on the seller's knowledge.21 9 The presence of
215. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.28, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979). For the
Code's definition of notice, see id. §§ 1301.01(Y), (AA).
216. Ofio REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.16(D) (Page 1952) (repealed 1962).
217. See, eg., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931)
(because the plaintiff requested a loaf of bread by its trade name, there was no breach of
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when a pin was found in the bread. Neverthe-
less, the court found a breach of warranty of merchantability because the seller was consid-
ered to be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind").
218. See, e.g., Craig v. Williams, 97 F. Supp. 725 (D. N.J. 1951) (there was no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because the dolly (Nelson Trailer Dolly) was
sold and purchased under a trade name). But see Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304
P.2d 45 (1956) (to preclude an implied warranty because the "Ashford Process" was sold
under its trade name would constitute a misinterpretation of the statute).
219. See, e.g., Tufts v. Schmuck, 8 Ohio N.P. 461, 11 Ohio Dec. 564 (1901). See OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.28, Official Comment 5 (Page 1979), which provides:
The elimination of the "patent or other trade name" exception constitutes the
major extension of the warranty of fitness which has been made by the cases and
continued in this Chapter. Under the present section the existence of a patent or
other trade name and the designation of the article by that name, or indeed in any
other definite manner, is only one of the facts to be considered on the question of
whether the buyer actually relied on the seller, but it is not of itself decisive of the
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a patent or trade name sale "may indicate no reliance at all, if it is
coupled with other factors, including an awareness by the seller of
the use to be made of the product, there could still be reliance by
the buyer and the creation of a warranty. 220
To establish the requisite reliance, the buyer must also demon-
strate that the seller possesses a peculiar knowledge or skill. The
buyer cannot rely upon the seller's skill and judgment even
though the seller knows of the buyer's intended use, if the seller's
skill, knowledge, and judgment are inferior to the buyer's. In this
case, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose could
not arise.221
To maintain an action for a breach of the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, the buyer must prove that there was a
defect in the goods which led to the alleged damages. In other
words, the goods must be unfit for the particular purpose as evi-
denced by a comparison between the goods as delivered and the
goods which were selected to satsify the buyer's particular pur-
pose.222
If a buyer can prove the elements of this warranty, there may
be recovery against the seller even if the requirements of an ex-
press warranty or an implied warranty of merchantability are not
present. Problems do arise, however, when the delivered goods
are both merchantable and conforming, but nevertheless do not
perform in the particular manner which the buyer reasonably ex-
pected. A warranty of fitness for a particular purpose can impose
liability where no such basis exists in the other warranties. There-
fore, while all warranty actions require a careful scrutiny of the
facts, special attention must be given to factual situations in cases
involving the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose.223
As noted in the preceding section, there are three restrictions
on the application of the implied warranty of merchantability: it
may be excluded or modified by the parties,224 it applies only
issue. If the buyer himself is insisting on a particular brand he is not relying on
the seller's skill and judgment and so no warranty results. But the mere fact that
the article purchased has a particular patent or trade name is not sufficient to
indicate non-reliance if the article has been recommended by the seller as ade-
quate for the buyer's purposes.
220. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 160, at § 7-26 to 7-27.
221. Prince v. Levan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alas. 1971). See also R. Clinton Constr. Co. v.
Bryant & Reeves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
222. Catania v. Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 231 A.2d 668 (1967).
223. Janssen v. Hook, 1 Ill. App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971).
224. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979).
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where the seller is a "merchant with respect to goods of that
kind,"" 5 and it applies only to a "contract for a sale of goods." '226
The first and third restrictions are also applicable to the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. However, the second
restriction on the implied warranty of merchantability is not ap-
plicable to the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because
this section refers only to a "seller,"2 2 7 and not to a "merchant
with respect to goods of that kind." '228 Therefore, if the buyer
proves both the seller's knowledge and reliance on that
knowledge, then any seller of those goods will be subject to the
provisions of the implied warranty. It must also be noted that the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be appli-
cable to the sale of secondhand goods.229
The sections of the Ohio Revised Code that set forth the im-
plied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose have been shown to be effective protections for buyers in
assuring the quality of goods bought. The Code, however, also
provides sellers with some weaponry. Perhaps the most important
right given to sellers is the power to exclude or modify warranties.
225. Id. § 1302.27.
226. Id. For a definition of a contract for a sale, see id. § 1302.01(A)(1 1).
227. Id. § 1302.28. For a definition of seller, see id. § 1302.01(A)(4).
228. For a definition of merchant, see id. § 1302.01(A)(5). See also notes 156-60 supra
and accompanying text.
229. See, eg., Brown v. Hall, 221 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1969) (although implied warranties of
fitness can attach in transactions involving secondhand goods, the liability of the original
seller is limited to the second buyer).
In General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 635, 185 S.E.2d
619, 622 (1971), the court held that "when goods are sold by an original purchaser to a
third party as used or second-hand goods, there is, of course, no implied warranty with
respect to the manufacturer or original seller." Furthermore, the court noted that "even
with respect to the original purchaser or second seller, absent special circumstances, the
rule is that there is no implied warranty as to the condition, fitness or quality of the article."
Id. The court in Halco clearly equated "secondhand" with "as is." While this result will
occur in some situations, the court lost sight of the fact that the holding must relate to the
facts of a particular case.
Even when a manufacturer sells secondhand goods, the implied warranty subsequently
created is not of the same scope as an implied warranty created by the sale of new goods.
The resulting warranty, however, should require that the goods were originally merchanta-
ble, and, if the buyer relies on the seller's judgment, then it should be implied that the
goods must still be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were intended. Notice that
under the Uniform Sales Act there was no exclusion of secondhand goods from the general
provision as to warranty. In Listman Mill Co. v. Miller, 131 Wis. 393, 111 N.W. 496
(1907), the court held that where a manufacturer sells goods which are normally a waste
product, an implied warranty as to the condition, fitness, or quality is not created. But, if a
manufacturer sells a "by-product" as one of the goods generally manufactured, it appears
to be immaterial whether the production of these goods was the main purpose of the busi-
ness.
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The next section of this Article examines the nature and scope of
this power.
IV. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES
A. Generally
Contract law holds sacred the right of the parties to enter into
legal agreements. The parties are free to fashion the terms of their
bargain in any way which protects their interests. The courts then
will honor the legal obligations created by the contract. For ex-
ample, when the buyer dickers over the qualities that certain
goods should possess or when the seller makes certain affirmations
about those goods, an express warranty that the goods will have
the agreed qualities is created, and the courts will enforce that
warranty in favor of the buyer. If the buyer and seller do not
specifically mention the quality of the goods sold, the law will im-
ply a warranty that the goods will meet at least the reasonable
expectations of the buyer.23°
Similarly, the parties are free to agree that no warranties, ex-
press or implied, will attach to the goods sold.
Parties to an agreement ought to be free to provide that the
buyer is purchasing goods without any warranties, express or
implied-that he is purchasing the goods in whatever condition
they now may happen to be, and without any promises (or only
certain specified but limited promises) from the seller as to the
quality of those goods.231
To protect the integrity of the freedom to contract, however,
there must be certain limitations on the exercise of this power to
exclude warranties. Often the seller who has a superior bargain-
ing position can impose certain conditions on the helpless buyer.
Two types of protection are available to prevent buyers who are in
weak bargaining positions from being forced to accept unfavora-
ble contract terms. First, the Ohio Revised Code contains provi-
sions which govern the exclusion or modification of warranties,232
230. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 24, at 267.
231. Id.
232. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979) provides:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(A) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever rea-
sonable as consistent with each other, but subject to the provisions of Section
1302.05 of the Revised Code on parol or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(B) Subject to division (C) of this section, to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
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the limitation of remedies,233 the cumulative effect of warran-
ties," 4 and the rules regarding third party beneficiaries of warran-
ties."~ Second, Congress has provided statutory protection for
consumer purchases through the enactment of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Improvement Act.
2 36
B. Section 1302.29
Section 1302.29 of the Code generally attempts to protect the
buyer from being unfairly surprised or oppressed by a seller's at-
tempt to omit or disclaim either the seller's legal obligations or
liability for a breach of warranty. 7 Official Comment 1 defines
the parameters of the section by noting that
[section 1302.29] is designed principally to deal with those fre-
quent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all war-
ranties, express or implied." It seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by deny-
ing effect to such language when inconsistent with language of
express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied war-
ranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances
which protect the buyer from surprise.
2 3 8
A seller is not permitted to avoid liability for breach of a warranty
by a disclaimer inconsistent with express warranties or by failing
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing and con-
spicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
(C) Notwithstanding division (B) of this section:
(I) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(2) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an exam-
ination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(3) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of deal-
ing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(D) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the pro-
visions of sections 1302.92 and 1302.93 of the Revised Code on liquidation or
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy.
233. Id.
234. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.30 (Page 1979).
235. Id. § 1302.31.
236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976).
237. See First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 M11. App. 2d 227, 235, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784
(1965).
238. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
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to notify the buyer of any disclaimers of implied warranties which
normally attach to any contract for sale.
Obviously, the primary objective of section 1302.29 is to pro-
tect the buyer from inadvertently relinquishing contract rights due
to a fine print waiver. 239 A disclaimer of warranty is an affirma-
tive defense to a breach of warranty action. Consequently, for a
disclaimer to be effective the seller must plead and prove its exist-
ence.24 As a general rule, any competent party to a transaction
may make any lawful contract. However, where the purchaser of
an automobile, for example, takes delivery of that automobile, he
or she expects that during the negotiations the parties came to
some sort of an agreement regarding the body style, the kind of
automobile, and its price, equipment, accessories, safety, dependa-
bility, and freedom from defects. Although at least one court has
held that a buyer may not waive the right to a car of merchantable
quality,24' the language of the Code seems to allow a buyer to do
exactly that. A buyer in this case is not entirely helpless, however.
As discussed previously, an express warranty is created by a
description of the goods.24 2 Thus, a buyer in this case retains the
right to receive goods which may be described as an automobile.
Even though the buyer expects to receive a new automobile, he or
she may disclaim all the warranties ordinarily imposed by law. As
one court aptly concluded:
Parties to an agreement may make any contract that comports
with general law, and if a "seller positively and expressly re-
fuses to give any warranty, and the contract is not induced by
fraud, no warranty of any kind can be implied by law." But to
come within these principles, the burden is upon the dealer to
show with particularity just what the buyer is waiving, that is,
which particular defects or condition the purchaser of a brand
new automobile explicitly waives.243
Similarly, other courts have held that words of disclaimer must
239. For an exhaustive analysis of warranty disclaimers, see generally Duesenberg, The
Manufacturer's Last Stand- The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW. 159 (1964); HAWLAND, Limita-
tion of Warranty Under the Uniform Commerical Code, 11 How. L.J. 28 (1965); Note, War-
ranty Disclaimer and Limitation of Remedy for Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. REv. 396 (1963).
In order to understand the historical underpinnings of the warranty of quality, see
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modem Sales Law, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 262
(1964).
240. Greenspun v. American Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1970); see
also R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at § 2-316:4.
241. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 187, 484 P.2d 380, 382 (1971).
242. See OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.26 (Page 1979).
243. 79 Wash. 2d at 194-95, 484 P.2d at 385-86.
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be carefully scrutinized and must not be favored where their effect
is to limit the rights, duties, and obligations between the parties to
the transaction."' Regardless of the terms to which the parties
agreed in the contract, unless there is an express departure from
the normal expectations of the buyer, the presumption is that the
seller intended to deliver goods of merchantable quality and the
buyer expected to receive such goods. In fact, one court stated:
"If there is any ambiguity in the contract or if the exculpatory
provision thereof is susceptable of two interpretations, the contract
will be construed most strongly against the party who prepared
it."245 If the seller intends to limit liability in a breach of warranty
situation to the payment of money, the cost of replacing a defec-
tive part, or the correction of any defect in material or workman-
ship, then the language in the contract must clearly reveal these
intentions.
Note, however, that despite the decline of the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor in contract law, the seller is not without rights under
the Code:
The seller is protected under this Chapter against false allega-
tions of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic
evidence and against unauthorized representations by the cus-
tomary "lack of authority" clauses. This Chapter treats the
limitations or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter
of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the matter of
creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists,
there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of
warranty. Under division (D) the question of limitation of
remedy is governed by the sections referred to rather than by
this section.246
Generally, the Code permits limitation of warranties either by
disclaimer, by modification, or by the buyer's waiver. Any limita-
tion which the buyer and seller agree upon establishes the outer
limits of protection; that is, the seller is not bound to perform be-
yond the parameters which the parties themselves established.247
C. Application of Section 1302.29
An effective disclaimer must be an integral part of the con-
tract, that is, without its inclusion the seller would not have sold
244. See generaly, Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
245. Henry v. W.S. Reichenback & Son, Inc., 32 Lehigh L.J. 524,45 Pa. D. & C.2d 171
(1968).
246. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Official Comment 2 (Page 1979).
247. John Deere Co. v. Tenberg, 445 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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the goods at the price obtained for them. To sustain the burden of
proving the existence of the disclaimer, the seller must establish
that the disclaimer was part of the basis of the bargain upon which
the buyer and the seller agreed. For the disclaimer provisions to
be effective, the seller must demonstrate that they are not uncon-
scionable248 and that they reflect both the seller's intent to dis-
claim liability and the buyer's acquiescence. If the seller cannot
sustain this burden of proof, then the claim of immunity from lia-
bility will fail.249
The aspect of section 1302.29 that should be noted initially is
that it prohibits the exclusion of express warranties.25° The Code
provides that words relating to the creation and limitation of ex-
press warranties are to be construed consistently with each other,
but where consistent construction is not possible, then words of
limitation are inoperative. Subsection (B) does allow the exclu-
sion of the implied warranties provided by the Code, but requires
that certain steps be followed.
A disclaimer delivered after the consummation of the sale is
ineffective. The statutory obligation created by the Code is so de-
manding that any attempt to limit liability must occur at the time
the contract is made and not at some later time. Unless the seller
can demonstrate the buyer's acceptance of a written warranty sub-
sequent to the consummation of the sale, the subsequent warranty
is not a substitute or an amendment of the original rights owed to
the buyer by the seller.2 ' To be effective, the terms of any limita-
tion or disclaimer of the warranty must be brought to the attention
of the buyer and explained in some detail.252
One of the initial requisites for the creation of an effective dis-
claimer, as set forth in section 1302.29, is the language which must
be included for the disclaimer to be effective. The disclaimer must
be conspicuous so that the buyer is aware of having assumed the
risk of the quality of the purchased goods.253 Statements made in
248. OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (Page 1979).
249. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1224 (3d Cir. 1970).
250. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979). Accord, Society Nat'l Bank v.
Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 29 (1979), a17'd No. 9502 (9th Dist. Ct. App. Oh. 1980). See
note 109 supra and accompanying text.
251. Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446 S.W.2d 521 (1969) (manufac-
turer's standard warranty was delivered to the buyer several days after the sale, but was not
effective because the seller failed to demonstrate that the buyer had accepted the warranty).
252. Support for this statement rests in the Code's doctrine of unconscionability; see
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (Page 1979) and accompanying Official Comment.
253. Section 1302.29(B) calls for conspicuousness in any attempted disclaimer of im-
plied warranties. Conspicuous is defined in § 1301.01(J):
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a manual or warranty book 54 as well as statements in a separate
writing255 can create a disclaimer provided they fulfill all the es-
sential requirements of section 1302.29. Subsection (B) sets forth
the statutory requirements. A disclaimer of the implied warranty
of merchantability must mention the word merchantability and, if
in writing, must be conspicuous.256 A disclaimer of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must both be in writ-
ing and be conspicuous.2 57
As a general rule, it is permissible for the parties to disclaim
either one portion of the sales contract, or one remedy, or both.
This disclaimer, however, cannot be so ubiquitous that it operates
to terminate all of the warranties or remedies available to the
buyer. As a general proposition, disclaimers must satisfy three
criteria. First, a disclaimer must state with great particularity
what it excludes or modifies; failure to do so will result in judicial
invalidation of that disclaimer.2 58 Second, there can be no dis-
claimer without notice. No disqualifications, exclusions, limita-
tions, or modifications of the Code's implied warranties are
effective absent the consumer's notification of such a disclaimer.2 5
9
Finally, to verify the lack of oppression and surprise and to assure
enforceability, the disclaimer, regardless of its form, must be sup-
ported by factual evidence indicative of its commercial reasona-
bleness and fairness. 6°
The case of Wilson Trading Co. v. David Ferguson, Ltd. 6' il-
lustrates the operation of multiple warranties in the same contract.
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or
other contrasting type of color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicu-
ous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the
court.
254. Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290, 178 N.W.2d 217
(1970).
255. In re Drexel Dynamics Corp., 3 U.C.C. RaP. 802 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contracts
App. 1966).
256. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(B) (Page 1979).
257. Id.
258. E.g., Berg v. Stromme, 1 Wash. App. 916, 465 P.2d 181 (1970).
259. Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 1013, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1966).
Perhaps a partial explanation for this general rule is that these implied warranties are ar-
guably within the consuming public's expectation of the quality of goods available for its
purchase.
260. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241,242, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (1969).
261. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968) (time limitation was
ineffective and manifestly unreasonable).
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In Wilson, the parties expressly agreed to create an unlimited ex-
press warranty of merchantability in one clause of the contract,
while in a separate clause they indirectly modified the express
warranty without mentioning the word "merchantability." The
court held that the language of the unlimited express warranty of
merchantability prevailed over the time limitation created by the
separate indirect modifying clause.262 The court reasoned that the
parties to a contract could not create an express unlimited war-
ranty and an express time limitation on a warranty without creat-
ing irreconcilable ambiguity. As the court correctly concluded,
the ambiguity's resolution required one warranty taking prece-
dence over the other. The court's rationale appears to be sup-
ported by the Official Comment to section 1302.93:
[The] parties are left free to shape their remedies to their partic-
ular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modi-
fying remedies are to be given effect. However, it is of the very
essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate rem-
edies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract
for sale within this Chapter, they must accept the legal conse-
quence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.
Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Chapter in an unconscionable manner is sub-
ject to deletion and in that event the remedies made available
by this Chapter are applicable as if the stricken clause had
never existed. . . . [W]here an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates
to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Chap-
ter.
2 6 3
Thus, although the Code provides for the disclaimer of implied
warranties, the seller's power to do so is not unlimited.
D. Disclaimer of Implied Warranties
Sections 1302.29(B) and (C) outline the procedures established
for the effective exclusion or modification of implied warranties.
Although there are different guidelines for the disclaimer of a
warranty of merchantability and a warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose, the procedures of sections 1302.29(B) and (C) apply
generally to both warranties. It must be kept in mind, however,
that a disclaimer of one will not be a disclaimer of the other be-
262. Id. at 405, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 114, 244 N.E.2d at 689.
263. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.93, Official Comment I (Page 1979). See also Eck-
stein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
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cause both may exist independently. 264
There are three basic ways that a disclaimer of an implied war-
ranty can occur; first, by the terms of the agreement itself; second,
by the buyer's examination of the goods; and third, by course of
dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade.
1. Disclaimers in the Agreement
The terms of the agreement control the presence or absence of
an effective disclaimer. Coupled with the conduct of the parties,
the terms of the agreement set the tone for the enforceability of a
disclaimer. Generally, language which tends to inform the pur-
chaser of any limitation, modification, or exclusion of the seller's
liability is enforceable and effective so long as the seller performs
according to the agreed upon terms of the contract.265
For a disclaimer in the agreement to be valid, certain criteria
must be met. First, there must be either written or oral evidence
of an agreement between the parties. Second, the transaction
must qualify as an Article 2 transaction. Third, the seller must
qualify as an Article 2 merchant.266 In Ford Motor Co. v. Pitt-
man,267 a manufacturer of an automobile admitted that the com-
pany neither sold directly nor serviced the vehicle which was
ultimately purchased by the consumer.268 Instead, the company
sold its automobiles through dealerships. The court held that for
the company to be permitted to create an enforceable and effective
disclaimer, it must show that it was a seller within the Code's defi-
nition, that the contract of sale was one that was enforceable
under the Code, and finally, that the contract provisions contain-
ing the disclaimers were part of the contract between it and the
dealer and not merely one item among many given to the buyer
when the automobile was purchased. 269
Courts generally abhor disclaimers of implied warranties and
264. The problem of contradictory provisions would arise, for example, if the seller
made an express warranty regarding quality, but at the same time stated the goods were
sold "as is." See, eg., Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 0. Misc. 26 (1979), aff'd No.
9502 (9th Dist. Ct. App. Oh. 1980) (express warranty not disclaimed in an "as is" sale).
265. Willis v. West Kentucky Feeder Pig Co., 132 IM. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d 899
(1971) (the seller's invoice contained language which would exclude warranties if not fol-
lowed by the buyer. Because the buyer failed to meet certain conditions precedent to re-
covery, his action for breach of warranty was unsuccessful).
266. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.02, .01(A)(4) (Page 1979).
267. 227 So. 2d 246 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969).
268. Id. at 249.
269. .d.
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strictly construe such disclaimers against the party seeking to as-
sert them.270 As noted earlier, the language of section 1302.29(B)
provides that any exclusion or modification of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability must specifically mention merchantabili-
ty, and if the disclaimer is in writing it must be conspicuous.
Exclusionary language neither written nor conspicuous will not be
enforced. Whether the exclusionary language is conspicuous is a
question of law, 271 but whether the language itself is exclusionary
is a question of fact for determination by the trier of fact.272
As a general rule of construction, the Code establishes that cer-
tain phrases are sufficient to inform the buyer of a valid dis-
claimer.27 3 Such phrases include "as is," "with all faults," or any
language of similar import which should reasonably indicate and
focus the buyer's attention upon the seller's disclaimer of implied
warranty.274 In Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc. ,275 the
court focused upon the buyer's awareness as a threshold standard
for a valid disclaimer. The court held that there was a valid dis-
claimer where a seven-year-old automobile was sold "as is" with
no guarantee. The court reasoned that the buyer was clearly
aware that the car was not a new car and that she would have to
bear the responsibility for repairs under the terms of the con-
tract.2 76 In First National Bank v. Husted,2 77 the court noted that
effective disclaimer language is not confined to the phrase "as is."
Consequently, the court held that a contract for the sale of an au-
tomobile on a retail installment basis, which stated that the pur-
chaser bought the car "in its present condition," was sufficient to
270. See e.g., Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 11. App. 2d 297,
216 N.E.2d 282 (1965) (although the contract for the sale of air conditioners was created
prior to the enactment of the UCC, the seller's attempted disclaimer of implied warranties
was ineffective).
271. Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 540, 226 N.E.2d 228, 231 (1967). See
also note 253 supra.
272. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286
N.E.2d 188 (1972).
273. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C) (Page 1979).
274. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C)(1) (Page 1979). Official Comment 7 for this
section notes:
Paragraph (1) of division (C) deals with general terms such as "as is," "as they
stand," "with all faults," and the like. Such terms in ordinary commercial usage
are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality of the
goods involved. The terms covered by paragraph (1) are in fact merely a particu-
larization of paragraph (3) which provides for exclusion or modification of im-
plied warranties by usage of trade.
275. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
276. Id. at 695-96, 239 A.2d at 47-48.
277. 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965).
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exclude any implied warranties. 8 Unlike Husted, the court in
Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. fallicoat279 held that the language "accepted
in its present condition" was not synonymous with "as is" or "with
all faults," and therefore, could not effectively exclude an implied
warranty of merchantability. Instead of triggering the buyer's
awareness that the seller had disclaimed all implied warranties,
the court reasoned that the language triggered only awareness re-
garding acceptance.2"'
Whether or not words of disclaimer meet the requirements of
section 1302.29(c)(1) depends upon a variety of elements. It is es-
sential that the following be considered: (1) whether there is com-
mon understanding attached to the meaning of such words;
(2) whether the words of disclaimer sufficiently focus the buyer's
attention on the limitations, exclusions, or modifications of the
warranties upon which they are intended to operate; and
(3) whether the language of the disclaimer is sufficiently clear and
obvious to the buyer. It should be noted that if both of the parties
to the transaction fully comprehend the significance of a dis-
claimer approved through arm's length bargaining, then the price
charged probably reflects the impact of the disclaimer. Thus, the
disclaimer should not operate to oppress the buyer, but instead,
should be made in good faith between parties situated in relatively
equivalent bargaining positions.
The test for "common understanding" is relatively concise.
Merely because the buyer does not actually comprehend the effect
of the disclaimer will not negate it so long as the meaning of the
disclaimer would have been clear to most buyers. If, however, the
seller has reason to know that this particular buyer does not un-
derstand the effect of the disclaimer, then it is unenforceable. Ad-
ditionally, the Code requires the seller to operate in good faith.
Failure to take steps to ensure that the buyer fully understands the
effect of the disclaimer is probably not good faith. This situation
occurred in Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co. ,28 where the buyer entered
into a contract for the sale of tomato seeds, and the ultimate deliv-
ery did not comply with the initial description of the seed. The
court determined that the misrepresentations of the manufacturer
were deliberate and held that in light of the manufacturer's
knowledge that the goods delivered included "rogues," the dis-
278. Id. at 236, 205 N.E.2d at 784-85.
279. 57 Tenn. App. 100, 415 S.W.2d 344 (1966).
280. Id. at 105, 415 S.W.2d at 346-47.
281. 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
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claimer of liability was ineffective. 282
The statutory interdependence of subsections (B) and (C) of
section 1302.29 produces some difficulty. The subsections are in-
terrelated in light of subsection (B)'s indication that it is subject to
subsection (C), and from subsection (C)'s reference back to sub-
section (B) indicated by its commencing with the words "notwith-
standing division (B)."
Section 1302.29(B) requires all written exclusionary language
to be conspicuous for it to constitute an enforceable negation of
implied warranties. In view of this requirement, it appears that in
order for "as is" or "with all faults" to negate implied warranties
pursuant to section 1302.29(C), these phrases must at least meet
the test of conspicuousness espoused in subsection (B).28 3 The in-
terdependence of these two subsections is manifested by the inten-
tion of the Code to focus the buyer's attention on the fact that the
seller is excluding implied warranties. The purpose of this section
of the Code is to prevent unfair surprise and oppression, and that
purpose is accomplished only if the exclusionary language is con-
spicuously set forth in the contract. One commentator interprets
subsection (C) as follows:
While the subsection does not explicitly so provide, it would
seem that these phrases and expressions would have to be
stated conspicuously to become effective disclaimers. Such a
requirement is consistent with the general rule that the dis-
claimer must "call" the risk to "the buyer's attention" and
"make . . .plain that there is no implied warranty. ' 284
Because a clause in the contract simply entitled "WARRANTIES"
may suggest to the buyer that the seller made warranties on the
goods rather than a disclaimer, all statements disclaiming warran-
ties must relate directly to the language of exclusion and not be
ambiguously couched in language associated with the inclusion of
a warranty.285
2. Buyer's Examination of, or Refusal to Examine, Goods
Section 1302.29(C)(2) establishes a second method for the dis-
claimer of an implied warranty. When the buyer examines the
282. Id. at 99-100, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18.
283. See Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286
N.E.2d 188 (1972).
284. 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 77 (1964).




goods, or refuses to examine them, prior to the creation of the
contract to sell, there is a disclaimer of all implied warranties
regarding patent defects in those goods.286 Any latent defects in
the goods, on the other hand, would remain covered by the im-
plied warranties. The underlying premise is that the seller should
not assume the risk of loss for those goods which the buyer has
fully examined or for those goods which, had the buyer examined
them, he or she would not have purchased. If the buyer, after a
thorough examination which reveals defects in the goods, persists
in using those goods and sustains losses and expenses, there
should be no cause of action for breach of implied warranty.
287
To exclude the implied warranties, the buyer must actually re-
fuse an offer to examine the goods. Exclusion is ineffective if the
buyer merely fails to take advantage of an opportunity to inspect
the goods. Section 1302.29, Comment 8, notes that
it is not sufficient that the goods are available for inspection.
There must in addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer
examine the goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the
buyer on notice that he is assuming the risk of defects which the
examination ought to reveal.2 88
The requirement of an actual refusal to examine is a recognition
by the Code that the selling techniques in a commercial setting
and the buyer's ignorance of the goods often effectively preclude
the purchaser from making a meaningful examination of the
goods. It is only after the seller has demanded that the buyer ex-
amine the goods, thereby warning the buyer of the possible loss of
the implied warranties, that the seller can be said to have laid the
foundation for successfully excluding the implied warranties from
the contract.289
286. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C)(2) (Page 1979) states:
[When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods, there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him.
287. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 89 (4th ed. 1916).
288. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Official Comment 8 (Page 1979).
289. Id. The buyer must clearly be put on notice of having assumed the risk of loss for
any defects found in the goods. This notice must be clear and unequivocal and is estab-
lished only when the seller demands that the buyer make the necessary examination. The
Code isolates several qualifications for this method of disclaiming warranties:
Application of the doctrine of 'caveat emptor' in all cases where the buyer exam-
ines the goods regardless of statements made by the seller is, however, rejected by
this Chapter. Thus, if the offer of examination is accompanied by words as to
their merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer indicates clearly that he
is relying on those words rather than on his examination, they give rise to an
"express warranty." In such cases the question is one of fact as to whether a
1981]
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The concept of examination must be distinguished from the
concept of inspection. An inspection helps the buyer decide
whether the goods as delivered conform to the contract,
290
whereas an examination is an element in determining whether the
seller owes any obligations to the buyer.2 9 1
When the Code calls for an examination, it does not require
examination of specific goods. If the seller shows the buyer a sam-
ple or model, and the buyer decides to purchase those goods, that
demonstration is sufficient to constitute an examination by sample
or model and allows the seller to exclude the implied warranties.
The goods must conform only to the sample or model. If there are
no patent defects visible in either the sample or model, then the
expectation of the buyer is that the goods which are delivered will
be of equal quality. If, however, there are patent defects and the
buyer does not notice or complain of them, the buyer cannot sub-
sequently use those imperfections as a basis for a breach of war-
ranty claim. Clearly, there are no implied warranties as to patent
defects which the examination of that sample or model ought to
have revealed to the buyer.
Until a seller fulfills a condition precedent imposed by the
contractual obligation, a buyer's inspection regarding the fitness
for use of the goods cannot be asserted against the buyer. For
warranty of merchantability has been expressly incorporated in the agreement.
Disclaimer of such an express warranty is governed by division (A) of the present
section.
The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods and
the circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the examination. A
failure to notice defects which are obvious cannot excuse the buyer. However, an
examination under circumstances which did not permit chemical or other testing
of the goods would not exclude defects which could be ascertained only by such
testing. Nor can latent defects be excluded by a simple examination. A profes-
sional buyer examining a product in his field will be held to have assumed the risk
as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe, while a nonpro-
fessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a
layman might be expected to observe.
Id.
290. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.56-.57 (Page 1979).
291. Id. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Official Comment 8, provides further gui-
dance as to the distinction between an inspection and an examination:
[W]arranties may be excluded or modified by the circumstances where the buyer
examines the goods or a sample or model of them before entering into the con-
tract. "Examinations" as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with inspec-
tion before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made. It
goes rather to the nature of the responsibility assumed by the seller at the time of
the making of the contract. Of course if the buyer discovers the defect and uses
the goods anyway, or if he unreasonably fails to examine the goods before he uses
them, resulting injuries may be found to result from his own action rather than
proximately from a breach of warranty.
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example, if a purchaser agreed to buy a mobile home and the
seller promised to put it up on blocks, but failed to do so properly,
then even though the buyer has examined the goods, a court
should not allow the seller to make an effective disclaimer on the
basis of the buyer's examination.
If the buyer has a skill equal to or greater than that of the
seller regarding the subject matter of the sale, then the buyer must
perform a more complete inspection than would a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. The inspection must be made even if
it entails added labor and inconvenience. The "professional"
buyer's failure to behave in this manner may negate any implied
warranties.292
As mentioned earlier, one court has held that the right to bring
an action in implied warranty does not depend exclusively on a
contractual relationship.293 The court carried this analysis to its
next logical step in Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,294 and
stated in dicta that an express contractual disclaimer of implied
warranties does not bar an implied warranty action in tort.295
Such a ruling, however, does not have universal application. The
court limited its decision by stating that the application of implied
warranty in tort to all products liability cases would render useless
many, if not all, of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions cov-
ering products liability:
[Wlhenever the doctrine of implied warranty in tort is applica-
ble, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code permit-
ting the parties to contractually modify or exclude warranties,
and to modify or limit remedies are of no avail. Stated another
way, where implied warranty in tort applies, the parties are not
free to determine by contract the quality of goods which the
seller is bound to deliver or the remedies available to the buyer
in the event that the goods do not measure up to the agreed
quality. It is clear, then, that the doctrine of implied warranty
in tort must be limited in its applicability. Otherwise, unlim-
ited application of the doctrine would emasculate the Uniform
Commercial Code provisions dealing with products liability.296
The court held that because the parties were both familiar with
the subject of the sale, because they dealt at arm's length, and be-
cause the plaintiff was seeking purely consequential damages,
292. See, e.g., Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971).
293. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 230-36, 218 N.E.2d 185,
188-92 (1966). See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
294. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
295. Id. at 156, 324 N.E.2d at 587.
296. Id. at 157-58, 324 N.E.2d at 588.
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rather than damages for injury to person or property, the theory of
implied warranty in tort was not available.297
3. Disclaimer by Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, or
Usage of Trade
The third provision of section 1302.29 allows an implied war-
ranty to "be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course
of performance or usage of trade. ' 298 In essence, this provision of
the Code allows for the automatic incorporation of the parties past
dealings or common industry understanding into the present con-
tract to sell. The importance of the provision comes from the idea
that the creation and disclaimer of implied warranties do not exist
in a vacuum and triers of fact need all available information in
determining the nature of the transaction. The practical effect of
this provision is to allow conduct or understanding to be brought
to bear on an imperfectly drafted disclaimer clause, and cause it to
be given effect.299 It seems clear that where the buyer and seller
have repeatedly dealt with each other on the basis of contracts
which have contained a certain clause, then it is relatively safe to
assume that the buyer will not be surprised by its operation. Some
factors which will determine whether the course of dealing or
course of performance are to be given effect are: the number of
prior dealings, the arm's length nature of the transaction, the
buyer's status as a businessperson, and the buyer's actual knowl-
edge of the disclaimer.3 00 The adequacy of usage of trade will
generally be easier for courts to determine, since objective evi-
dence will usually be available. As a general rule, a disclaimer
given effect by usage of trade operates to bind members of the
trade or persons who know or should know about it.30 1
Allied Industrial Service Corp. v. Kasle Iron & Metals, Inc. 302 is
illustrative of the operation of section 1302.29(c)(3). The defend-
ant hired the plaintiff to design a system to control the emission of
pollutants from its scrap iron processing business. The plaintiff
proposed a unique system and advised the defendant that it would
be unable to warrant or guarantee that the installation of this
unique system would solve the defendant's problem. When the
297. Id. at 158, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
298. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C)(3) (Page 1979).
299. See, e.g., Holcombe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971).
300. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 454-57 (2d ed. 1980).
301. See id. at 457.
302. 620 Ohio App. 2d 144, 405 N.E.2d 307 (1977).
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system failed to eliminate the discharge of the pollutants, the de-
fendant terminated the contractual relationship and requested
damages for the breach of implied warranties.3 °3 The court held
that the implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a
particular purpose were excluded by the course of dealing be-
tween the parties. There was clearly a mutual understanding be-
tween the parties that no warranties or guarantees were intended
to apply to the performance of the system after its installation.304
Although disclaimers of warranties are the most important of
the seller's tools under the Code, they are by no means the only
ones. The next section of this Article analyzes a second power
given to sellers by the Ohio Revised Code-the power to limit the
buyer's remedy for breach of warranty.
V. LIMITATION OF REMEDIES
If it were possible, the seller would be delighted to disclaim all
warranties. It is equally obvious, however, that the seller must
offer some warranty to the buyer to induce the making of the con-
tract for sale. Consequently, the seller must compromise between
a full protective warranty and no warranty. To strike this balance
the seller often limits the buyer's remedies for breach of warranty.
In essence, a disclaimer of warranties and a liquidated damage
clause are two different ways of achieving the same re-
sult-protection of the seller from full liability for defective goods.
For example, a limitation of remedy occurs when a seller includes
a liquidated damages clause in the original contract between the
parties. 5 The purpose of a liquidated damages clause is to pre-
clude a later judicial determination of the amount of damages
owed by the seller because of a breach. Furthermore, the seller
may not wish to be limited to a liquidated damages clause, in
which case liability may be limited to repair or replacement of the
defective goods.
Section 1302.93 regulates a seller's ability to limit the remedies
available to a buyer upon delivery of nonconforming goods. This
section of the Code permits the parties to agree mutually to reme-
dies which are not provided for in other sections of the Code. For
example, the amount of damages recoverable by the buyer may be
303. Id. at 145, 405 N.E.2d at 309. The instant suit arose as a result of the plaintiff
suing for the balance due for services performed. The defendant then counterclaimed,
requesting damages for breach of contract, breach of warranty and negligent performance.
304. Id. at 144, 147, 405 N.E.2d at 308, 310.
305. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.92(A) (Page 1979).
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limited or altered, perhaps being limited to the repair or replace-
ment of nonconforming goods. 3 6 Nevertheless, whenever reme-
dies upon which the parties agree, fail in their "essential purpose,"
the limitations are invalid and the buyer may resort to all reme-
dies provided for in the Code.30 7 Consequential damages may
also be limited by the parties.3 8 However, any limitation of con-
sequential damages for injury to the person resulting from a con-
sumer good is unconscionable and thus unenforceable.30 9
The ability of the parties to vary remedies which may accrue
to the nonbreaching party depends upon three provisions.3 0
First, the variations must be found within the contract and must
have been part of the basis of the bargain upon which the contract
was created. At this juncture, the question of "conspicuousness"
becomes relevant and the court must ascertain whether the pur-
chaser was aware of the variation limiting the seller's liability.
Second, the substitute remedies must not fail in their "essential
purpose." "[WIhere an apparently fair and reasonable clause, be-
cause of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive
either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give
way to the general remedy provisions of this Chapter. '311 Third,
the variation found in the contract must not work an unconsciona-
ble result. Conscionability is imposed upon both the limitation
and exclusion of consequential damages. Thus, a contract for
consumer goods which excludes consequential damages for per-
sonal injury is prima facie unconscionable. On the other hand, a
limitation precluding the recovery for a purely commercial loss is
not unconscionable.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Goddard v. General Motors
Corp. 312 recently resolved the issue regarding a buyer's remedies
when the seller has disclaimed consequential damages, but the
306. Id. § 1302.93(A)(1).
307. Id. § 1302.93(B). See notes 311-13 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of "failure of its essential purpose."
308. Id. § 1302.93(C). Official Comment 2 to § 1302.29 states:
This Chapter treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a
matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the matter of creation of
liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of
limiting remedies for breach of warranty. Under division (D) the question of
limititation of remedy is governed by the sections referred to [1302.92 and
1902.93] rather than by this section.
309. Ohio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.92(C) (Page 1979).
310. See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, supra note 23, at 276-79.
311. OIIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.92, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
312. 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979).
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remedy agreed upon failed of its essential purpose. The plaintiff
in Goddard purchased an automobile which the defendant war-
ranted for the standard period of twelve months or 12,000 miles.
The warranty was limited to repair or replacement of any defec-
tive parts and expressly precluded recovery for any consequential
damages. The new car was so riddled with defects, however, that
the seller was unable to repair the vehicle. The court held that
where the remedy agreed upon fails of its essential purpose, the
buyer may resort to the remedies provided in the general provi-
sions of the Code. Therefore, despite the disclaimer of conse-
quential damages, the plaintiff was permitted to recover
consequential damages pursuant to section 1302.88(C). 13
The most difficult issue to arise in cases of this nature is decid-
ing the point at which the contractual remedies fail of their essen-
tial purpose. The resolution of the issue can be found by
determining what the Code regards as the essential purpose of
remedies. At base, the Code requires minimally adequate reme-
dies. A contractual clause limiting the buyer's remedy to repair or
replacement is an attempt by the seller to avoid paying for conse-
quential damages caused by the breach. A repair or replacement
clause will fail of its essential purpose when, as in Goddard, the
repair or replacement of defective parts does not put the goods in
warranted condition. Clearly, the remedy provided was not mini-
mally adequate.
An additional point which must never be overlooked is that,
regardless of the liability arrangements made between the buyer
and the seller, the seller must provide the buyer with a minimally
adequate remedy or face the possibility that the contract will be
declared unconscionable.314 The purpose of the remedies section
of the Code is to insure that the parties to the contract have a
remedy. Therefore, any clause in a contract which eliminates all
313. Id. at 47, 396 N.E.2d at 765.
The decision in Goddard neglects § 1302.93(C) which permits the exclusion of conse-
quential damages unless it is unconscionable. The court avoided an analysis of whether
the standard twelve-month car warranty's exclusion of consequential damages is conscion-
able and instead created an irrebutable presumption that is unconscionable. In fact, by
permitting the plaintiff to recover consequential damages, the court has left serious doubt
as to whether an exclusion of consequential damages will be sustained when the remedy
fails of its essential purpose. This broad ruling will have serious ramifications on numerous
commercial contracts for the sale of unique machinery and equipment because many times
the purchaser will disclaim any right to recover consequential damages in order to receive a
lower sales price. The issue of whether the Goddard decision is isolated to consumer
purchases must be left to subsequent decisions for an ultimate resolution.
314. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.92, Official Comment 1 (Page 1979).
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remedies or limits them so as to work an unconscionable result
will not be enforced.
VI. CUMULATION AND CONFLICT OF WARRANTIES
Section 1302.30 of the Ohio Revised Code mandates that all
warranties, express or implied, are to be construed whenever pos-
sible as consistent with each other and as cumulative.3 5 This ba-
sic concept is consistent with the underlying principles of the
entire Code. It encourages, by liberal interpretation, the philoso-
phy that all contracts must be performed. As part of that philoso-
phy the Code provides that no warranty can be created except if
the seller takes some affirmative action or fails to take some re-
quired action. 16 Therefore, all warranties must be treated cumu-
latively and consistently unless such treatment would produce an
unreasonable result or would be impossible to enforce.3 7
Where it is necessary to determine the intention of the parties,
and where their intention concerning the priority of the warranties
is not readily apparent, section 1302.30 provides the rules of con-
struction which a court may use to determine which warranty
takes precedence over another. Generally, the express warranty
takes precedence over the implied warranty, with the exception
that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is not
so displaced. Corollaries to the general rule provide, first, that ex-
act or technical specifications given for goods will displace incon-
sistent samples, models, or general language of description. 318
Second, a sample taken from a bulk in existence at the time it is
offered for sale takes precedence over an inconsistent description
given in general language.319 In essence, the most precise and spe-
cific warranty is the one that is given effect.
315. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.30 (Page 1979) provides:
Cumulation and conflict of warranties express or implied. Warranties whether
express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumula-
tive, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall
determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention, the follow-
ing rules apply:
(A) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or
general language of description.
(B) A sample from an e~isting bulk displaces inconsistent general language of
description.
(C) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
316. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.26-.28 (Page 1979).
317. Id. § 1302.28, Official Comment 2.
318. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.30 (Page 1979).
319. Id.
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The drafters of the Code anticipated that section 1302.30
would not come into operation until the trier of fact ascertained
what the parties intended by their contractual terms. In Bancroft
v. San Francisco Tool Co. ,320 the court held that where a buyer
had the power of approval over a set of specifications prepared by
the seller in the building of an elevator, the buyer could not re-
cover so long as the elevator conformed to those specifications.
Conformity to specifications took precedence over any other war-
ranty. While the decision presents an excellent example of the
problems resolved by section 1302.30, the decision would have
been inconsistent with the Code. The court determined that con-
formity to the specification was not the expectation of the buyer;
rather, the purchaser expected that the elevator would work as an
elevator should work. Since the intention of the party in that par-
ticular instance was to get an elevator that worked, it appears that
the dominant warranty was perhaps an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, or at least an implied warranty of
merchantability. 32'
The "intention" test might be criticized as being too subjective
to permit the trier of fact to arrive at the meaning of the contract
terms. It may even be urged that stricter rules of construction are
necessary to preserve the sanctity of the contract. Nevertheless, it
seems that, wherever possible, the court must initially determine
the intention of the parties. The precise terms of the contract are
reflected in the price and the performance of the contract, and the
intention of the parties can best interpret these terms. The insis-
tence upon a rigid rule of construction for terminology that the
parties agreed to after they initially entered into: the contract will
often result in an interpretation of the contract which is inconsis-
tent with the parties' original intention. Thus, despite its short-
comings, the "intention" test is defensible because there is no
superior rule of interpretation.322
The rationale for the enforcement of these rules is that the in-
tention of the parties controls the interpretation of the terms of the
contract. The intention is ascertained by referring to factors
which tend to reflect that party's intention in the terms of the con-
tract. These are not absolute rules. They can be preempted by
320. 120 Cal. 228, 52 P. 496 (1898). See generally R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra
note 160, at § 7-04.
321. See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281 (1961).
322. See generally R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 160, at § 7-04.
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showing that at the time of entering into the transaction, condi-
tions were such that any construction described in this section is
inconsistent or unreasonable.3 23 Therefore, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to determine the intent of the parties. Obviously, it is
possible even that the agreement between the parties can specifi-
cally provide for the method of interpreting any terms in issue
when problems arise. Although this section establishes general
rules of construction regarding the relative weight to be accorded
to specifications, samples, or inconsistent warranties, the common
law governing the interpretation or construction of written con-
tracts is applicable to these sales contracts as well.3 24
The provisions of section 1302.30 apply only when an incon-
sistency exists among the warranties found in the contract. Fur-
thermore, since it is essential that the seller act in good faith, it
would seem to be bad faith for the seller to insert mutually exclu-
sive warranties within a contract. There are a number of situa-
tions where section 1302.30 is inapplicable. For example, its
application may prove unnecessary if the meaning of the contract
terms are clear and concise or if there is a valid disclaimer of war-
ranties found within that contract. Moreover, if there is only one
warranty within the contract or if section 1302.05, the parol evi-
dence rule, precludes the buyer from proving the existence of the
alleged inconsistent warranty, then section 1302.30 need not be
applied.
Although the Code permits cumulation of warranties, implied
warranties cannot exist if the contract contains express warranties
regarding the precise subject matter upon which the implied war-
ranties are based.325 Unless specifically supplanted by an express
warranty, implied warranties and express warranties may coexist,
and each can be enforced independently if a breach occurs.32 6
Only a precise and complete specification as to the goods, ex-
pressly written into the contract and supplied by the buyer, will
overcome any of the implied warranties.32 7
323. OHIfo REv. CODE ANN. § 1301.30, Official Comment 3 (Page 1979).
324. Id. Comment 3 explicitly provides that the listing in this section is not exhaustive.
Therefore, the common law rules of construction are -clearly applicable to transactions
within the meaning of this section.
325. Kilmate-Pruf Paint & Varnish Co. v. Klein Corp., I N.C. App. 431, 161 S.E.2d
747 (1968).
326. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 510 n.17
(W.D. Mo.), rev'd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1971).
327. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa.), afl'din
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VII. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF WARRANTIES
The preceding discussions involved the nature of the particular
warranty in issue and its effect, including the protection afforded
to the purchaser of the goods and whatever rights existed in the
seller or the buyer when a dispute arose over a transaction in
goods. The threshold question involving the third party benefi-
ciaries of either express or implied warranties is not the nature of
the defect nor the imposition or avoidance of liability, but rather,
one of to whom the liability extends.
Where the buyer purchases goods from the seller and is in-
jured by a defect in the goods, before a recovery of damages from
the seller will be permitted, the buyer must prove that a defect did
exist, that a breach of warranty occurred, and that as consequence
of that breach the buyer was injured. However, what if it is not
the buyer who has been injured? Suppose it was his wife, child, or
any member of his family, or someone in his employ, or even a
guest? Do the various degrees of consanguinity make a difference
as to whether the buyer or those other parties can recover?
The problem can become quite difficult. The point at which
the injured party is too remote from the seller or the supplier of
those defective goods to reasonably expect recovery from them
must be determined. Both the courts and the triers of fact must
attempt to establish a terminus beyond which the seller cannot
reasonably be expected to compensate an injured party. Section
1302.31 of the Ohio Revised Code is designed to deal with these
problems.
Historically, the determination as to when liability would
cease to attach was based on whether the plaintiffs action was in
tort or in contract.3 28 For example, if the plaintiffs cause of action
was premised on a contractual transaction, recovery was effec-
tively denied to any injured person not a party to the contract or
not in privity of contract with the seller.32 9 Similarly, the majority
view denied recovery for breach of warranty in tort unless there
was privity between the plaintiff and the defendant.330 The ra-
tionale was that liability for the breach of warranty was created
only when there was a contractual relationship between the plain-
part and vacated inpart on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1968).
328. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
329. Accord, Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39; contra, W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 676-78.
330. See, eg., Wright v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965).
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tiff and defendant. Welsh v. Ledyard3 3 1 illustrates this approach.
A woman was injured by an electrical shock when she grasped the
handle of an electric cooking appliance purchased by her hus-
band. The court held that there was no implied warranty entitling
the plaintiff to recovery because she was not in privity with the
seller.332
The original impetus for expanded protection of the purchaser
under the warranties of the Code was provided by the enactment
of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-318 and the three alterna-
tives provided by the 1966 amendments. 333 Section 2-318 was not
expected to be the definitive line regarding where the seller's lia-
bility would cease. In Official Comment 3, the drafters expressly
invited further common law development, thus offering section 2-
318 as a minimum level of protection.334 The purpose of section
2-318 "is to give to the buyer's family, household and guests, the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the con-
tract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any tech-
nical rules as to 'privity.' ,331 Implicit in this statement is the idea
that any breach of warranty extends the benefits of the contractual
warranty to the injured third party because the seller has war-
ranted that the goods sold are merchantable and fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which such goods are used.
Ohio adopted the original version of the Uniform Commercial
Code rule on third party beneficiaries of warranties.336 The Com-
ments to the Code section provided that beyond the expressly in-
cluded beneficiaries-a natural person who is in the family or
household of the buyer or a guest reasonably expected to use the
goods--"the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
331. 167 Ohio St. 57 (1957).
332. Id. at 60.
333. It should be noted that Ohio has adopted the original section rather than the
amendments. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1979) with UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (1978 VERSION).
334. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978 version).
335. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31, Official Comment 2 (Page 1979).
336. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1979) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
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tributive chain." '337 Moreover, the section does not supersede or
in any way affect any right or remedy grounded in negligence.338
Some states recognized that the peculiar local emphasis of
their jurisdictions required some adaptation or modification of the
Uniform Commercial Code's original section. In a similar vein,
the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code recognized the need for broader protection. Consequently,
in 1966 the Editorial Board amended the 1962 section by supple-
menting the original section with two alternatives,339 and simulta-
neously, amended the comments. Comment 3 states that
Alternative B is designed for those jurisdictions in which the case
law had already developed further than the scope of the original
section and for those jurisdictions that desired to expand this class
of beneficiaries. Alternative C further expands the class of benefi-
ciaries and is asserted to be consistent with recent decisions utiliz-
ing section 402A of the Restatement of Torts.340
Liability arising under section 1302.31 cannot be limited or ex-
cluded by the seller. This provision does not mean that the seller
is precluded from disclaiming certain kinds of warranties as to all
persons, 341 but it does mean that if a warranty exists, all persons
within section 1302.31 are covered. For example, an injured by-
stander can maintain the same cause of action against the seller as
337. Id., Official Comment 3.
338. Id., Official Comment 2.
339. U.C.C. § 2-318:2 (1978) provides two alternatives:
ALTERNATIVE B.
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty. The seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
ALTERNATIVE C.
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. The seller may not exclude or limit the opera-
tion of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends.
340. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
341. See OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979).
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the original party to the contract. One way the seller can avoid
liability is to limit liability as to all persons prior to the formation
of the contract.342
A seller's liability may rest on reasonable foreseeability that
the goods could possibly produce an injury. For example, in Har-
ris v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ,343 a minor was injured
while trying to open a bottle of beer. The court held that it was
reasonable for merchants to expect, or believe that it was possible,
for a child to be injured by such defective goods. Addressing the
seller's expectations, the court noted:
It was of no consequence that the bottle contained beer instead
of milk, ginger ale, or one of the many kinds of beverages regu-
larly purchased, used and consumed by members of families.
There was nothing illegal, as argued by the defendant, in the
plaintiff's handling of the bottle in his home. Bottled beer is
part of the legal larder of many homes, and is frequently han-
dled and sometimes consumed with parental approval, by chil-
dren. It was to be expected by the seller, in usual
circumstances, that a father retained the parental prerogative of
having his son fetch him a cold bottle of beer.3 '
Harris is a good example of the broad liability courts have found
for injury arising from defective products, once the requirement of
privity was abolished. The popularity of Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-318 is further evidenced by the application of its
philosophy in areas other than warranty law.
Section 1302.31 is cumulative in its effect. Its purpose in the
Code is to broaden the class of persons having the right to sue for
an injury. This section does not, and will not, modify or restrict
any other theory of liability which might already exist. Accord-
ingly, such tort theories as negligence and strict liability are com-
patible with section 1302.31.
A breach of warranty action does not require the plaintiff to
show negligence by the defendant. Since a breach of warranty
action may be pursued jointly with any other theory, the barring
of a warranty action because of lack of privity should not auto-
matically result in the barring of another action brought on the
theory of negligence. If the barring of one theory barred all other
theories of relief, a manufacturer of goods might be able to sell
defective goods and not be liable to the ultimate consumer for an
injury caused by the defect. Unfortunately, too many jurisdictions
342. See discussion on disclaimer of warranties at notes 230-97 supra.
343. 4 UCC REP. 585 (Mass. App. Ct. 1962).
344. Id. at 587.
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permit the warranty to run only to the retailer rather than directly
to the injured party. In doing so, the jurisdictions ignore commer-
cial reality and actually encourage multiple law suits in order for
the consumer to receive compensation.
The Code provision on third party beneficiaries was never in-
tended to be conclusive as to who was the proper party to bring a
breach of warranty action.345 Nevertheless, many courts inter-
preted these words narrowly, and the original section remains the
majority view.
Section 1302.31 extends the warranty protection to third par-
ties who are natural persons. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equipment Co. ,346 the Ohio Supreme
Court strictly construed the meaning of natural persons. Auto
Fleet Co., a truck leasing company, purchased a defective truck
from the defendant. The plaintiff, the insurer of the leasing com-
pany, settled with the lessee and under a subrogation clause
brought an action against defendant for breach of implied war-
ranty. The Court stated that section 1302.31 did not extend the
benefit of the Code's four year statute of limitations to the plain-
tiff's subrogor since the subrogor was not a party to the contract
for sale and the plaintiff was a corporation, not a natural per-
son.
347
Under section 1302.31 and the alternatives provided in the
1966 amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code, a member
of the buyer's immediate family, or a person living within the
household, should receive the benefits of warranties extended to
the buyer. Problems do arise when the injured plaintiff has a
more remote relationship to the immediate buyer or is not residing
in the home of the buyer. In Woodrich v. Smith Gas Services,
Inc. ,348 an Illinois court permitted the injured wife of the pur-
chaser of an automobile with a defective auto-start device to re-
cover damages despite the lack of privity between the injured
party and the seller. In this particular case, it did not seem to
make any difference that it was the husband's employer who actu-
ally paid for the auto-start device.
A Pennsylvania trial court in Miller v. Preitz3 49 denied recov-
ery in an action brought against the seller, the distributor, and the
345. See notes 329-39 supra and accompanying text.
346. 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
347. Id. at 249, 257 N.E.2d at 383.
348. 87 IlM. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
349. 2 U.C.C. REP. 88 (Common Pleas Ct. Pa. 1964).
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manufacturer of a defective humidifier which caused the death of
the buyer's young nephew. The trial court held that the nephew
had to be in privity of contract with the defendant to recover.
Furthermore, the court commented that the reference to "family
or household" in Pennsylvania's counterpart to Ohio Revised
Code section 1302.31 did not include nonmembers of the house-
hold and there was no intent on the part of the Pennsylvania legis-
lature to extend such protection to all blood relatives of a
purchaser of defective goods. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
on appeal held that the decedent was within the meaning of "fam-
ily" of the purchaser and therefore an action could be maintained
against the seller, notwithstanding a lack of privity.35 °
The court's discussion of the case indicated that the word
"family" was not intended to restrict warranty coverage unduly.
The proper standard for analysis is whether it is reasonable to ex-
pect that such person might use, consume, or be affected by the
goods. This reasonable expectation approach is determined by
considering all the circumstances which surround the purchase
and the use of the goods. Obviously, when all the circumstances
surrounding the purchase and use of the goods are considered, the
geographical remoteness of the family relation will be evaluated.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Miller did not sustain the
action against the more remote sellers, the distributor and the
manufacturer, because the decedent had not been within the bene-
fits of any implied warranty made by them. Thus it can be de-
duced that Pennsylvania has not completely abandoned all privity
requirements in its implied warranties cases. Courts of other
states have allowed individuals found to be within the statutory
definition of family to sue for breach of warranty regardless of
age35' or marital status. 2
Under section 1302.31 recovery is more likely for personal in-
juries than for nonpersonal injuries such as property damage. If
there is only an economic loss suffered, the requirement of privity
of contract still seems to be a necessity. The basis for this insis-
tance is simple; section 1302.31 limits recovery to one "who is in-
350. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
351. See, e.g., Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Legal Register Reps. 159 (Pa.
1962) (minor son injured by defective shotgun and shells purchased by his father was
within the "family" and was allowed to sue the retailer and manufacturer for breach of
warranty).




jured in person" and economic injury is not considered such an
injury.35 3
Numerous attempts to broaden the doctrine established in sec-
tion 1302.21 have been initiated in other jurisdictions. In Kenney
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,35 the purchaser received a written war-
ranty of one year on the wiring and five years on all sealed parts
of a new refrigerator. The warranty remedy was limited to repair
or replacement of any defective parts. The refrigerator proved de-
fective and set fire to the apartment building in which the pur-
chaser lived. The owner of the building attempted to bring a
breach of warranty action against the seller. The threshold issue
for the court was whether Uniform Commercial Code section 2-
318 applied to property damage. The court held that section 2-318
applied to personal injuries but not to injuries to real property.355
The court held that it made no difference that the owner of the
apartment building and the purchaser of the refrigerator were
mother and daughter. 6
The Code requires that for a person to have a cause of action,
he or she must be a guest in the home of the buyer. Therefore, it
is obvious that a passenger injured in the purchaser's automobile
is not covered under the various analogues to section 1302.21 be-
cause the automobile cannot be considered to be the purchaser's
home.35 7 Similarly, recovery is not possible if the guest is injured
in any public place, such as a restaurant.3 8
There is a point beyond which section 1302.31 does not extend
as a contract principle. Section 1302.31 should not be applied to
the injured user of a defective article who has received that article
from a guest in the home of the buyer, unless, of course, the user is
353. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio
St. 2d 244, 249, 257 N.E.2d 380, 383 (1970).
354. 355 Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d 649 (1969).
355. Id. at 609, 246 N.E.2d at 653.
356. Id., 246 N.E.2d at 653.
357. See, e.g., Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1961). But see
Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga. App. 101, 137 S.E.2d 675 (1964). In Bobbin v. Dinger
Chevrolet, Inc., 65 Schuykill Legal Rec. 121 (Common Pleas Ct. Pa. 1970), the purchaser of
a defective automobile subsequently married his injured passenger;, this passenger was not
allowed to maintain a suit for breach of warranty against the defendant. The court com-
mented that Pennsylvania law had not extended the warranty protection to include auto-
mobile passengers or others who do not fall within the range of "reasonable foreseeability."
358. See Galenek v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 24 Mass. App. Dec. 134 (1962) (guest in
restaurant for whom escort bought food could not recover under U.C.C. § 2-318). But see
Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2123 (D.C. V.I. 1968) (restaurateur strictly
liable for food served because "it is immaterial that the injured patron is not the person
who paid for the meal").
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also a guest in the home of the buyer.35 9 Relying on Alternative A
in section 2-318, a Massachusetts court in Galaned v. Howard
Johnson, Inc. ,36o held that a girl who became sick from eating a
hot dog purchased by her friend could not maintain an action for
breach of warranty for fitness because she lacked privity of con-
tract with the defendant. Although she was the buyer's guest, she
was not a household guest nor a member of his family, and there-
fore she was not a third party beneficiary.
The general rule is that only the purchaser or someone who
falls within one of the classifications in section 1302.31 can re-
cover for an injury produced as a consequence of a breach of an
implied warranty. Thus, where a lease rather than a sale relation-
ship is the basis for the action, or where the injured person is a
guest in the home of a donee of the buyer or is a mere bystander,
recovery will generally be denied in an action against the seller for
breach of implied warranty. Extensions of this rule have generally
taken the form of a statutory enactment of either Alternative B or
C, or of case development which has based the recovery on strict
liability.361 Section 1302.21 tends to deny recovery to third parties
for breach of warranty when it appears that, due to the remoteness
of the party injured, the seller would become an insurer against all
liability. A finding of liability, however, may have merit since the
seller put the goods, admittedly defective, into the channel of
trade and induced the purchase of the goods. Furthermore, those
in the seller chain probably could more easily bear the burden of
economic injury caused by the defective goods.
Under section 1302.31 recovery is more likely for personal in-
juries than for nonpersonal injuries such as property damage. If
there is only an economic loss suffered, the requirement of privity
of contract still seems to be a necessity. The basis for this insis-
tance is simple; section 1302.31 limits recovery to one "who is in-
jured in person" and economic injury is not considered such an
injury.
The provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, discussed in the pre-
vious pages, are not the totality of a buyer's warranty protection
359. Wolovitz v. Falco Prods. Co., 1 U.C.C. REP. 135 (Common Pleas Ct. Pa. 1963).
See generally, Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010.
360. 24 Mass. App. Dec. 134 (1962).
361. For a discussion of the idea that everything which is accomplished using a strict
tort theory of recovery is also acceptable using Code warranties, see Shanker, 4 Reexami-
nation of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of
Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 550 (1979).
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against defective goods. Congress has also sought to enact some
consumer protection legislation, and the next section of this Arti-
cle discusses the most important of those enactments.
VIII. MAGNUSON-MOSS 362 WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT
The provisions of the Ohio Revised Code addressing the crea-
tion and limitation of warranties have, to a certain extent, miti-
gated the harshness of the doctrine of caveat emptor. The Code
provisions have supplied a set of ground rules to protect one party
from the other's overreaching. These rules are particularly impor-
tant between buyers and sellers who are familiar with the intrica-
cies of commercial transactions and who possess the bargaining
power to consummate their dealings at arm's length.
Even though the Code is intended to apply to all commercial
transactions, its warranty provisions do not always afford the con-
sumer the same degree of protection that they offer the exper-
ienced businessperson. For example, a manufacturer may fashion
his or her own express warranty on the goods and provide that
this warranty is given in lieu of all other warranties, express or
implied. The ordinary inexperienced consumer may be deceived
into believing that this provides an effective protection against any
defects in the goods. In point of fact, however, the express state-
ment operates as an effective disclaimer of the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.363 It has
been observed that
when a consumer brings a defective product in for service
under a present style warranty, he is invariably in for a rude
shock-discovering that the "warranty" he has received at the
time of purchase could be more accurately described as a limi-
tation on the manufacturer's liability. The consumer's rights
are usually diminished rather than increased by the common
law courts as being what reasonable men would expect to be-
lieve the results of the purchase and sale of items in the market-
place would imply. Unfortunately, the present law allows a
seller to renounce these implied warranties. Where this is done
362. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, §§ 201-206, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970))
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976)) (hereinafter referred to as the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act or the Act). The Act was enacted on January 4, 1975, and took effect on July
4, 1975, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2312(a). For rules, regulations, and interpretations under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, see 16 C.F.R. §§ 705.1 (1980).
363. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(B)(1) (Page 1979). See the discussion on dis-
claimer of implied warranties, notes 279-309 srupra and accompanying text.
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between merchants, this may be acceptable. But when it is
forced on a consumer who lacks effective purchasing power to
command better terms of sale it is outrageous.
364
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was enacted to ameliorate
the consumer's unequal position resulting from the limited protec-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code. Title I of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act establishes minimum disclosure requirements
of the written warranty terms given in connection with the sale of
consumer products. It also prescribes certain minimum content
standards for those warranties. During the Congressional debates,
Representative Moss, cosponsor of the Act, expressed the hope
that
[o]ne of the most important effects of the legislation will be its
ability to relieve consumer frustration by promoting under-
standing and by providing meaningful remedies. The bill
should also foster intelligent consumer decisions by making
warranties understandable. At the same time, warranty compe-
tition should be fostered, since consumers would be able to
judge accurately the content and differences between warran-
ties for competing consumer products.365
While this Article will focus on title I, brief mention should be
made of title II. This essentially procedural section gives the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) authority to regulate unfair or de-
ceptive practices in commerce.366 The section also expands the
FTC's rulemaking and investigative authority, dispute resolution
mechanisms and enforcement powers in the consumer warranty
area.
3 67
A. Scope of the Act
Unlike Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is
applicable to all "goods," 3 68 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
covers a more limited group of items referred to as "consumer
products." The Act defines a consumer product as "any tangible
personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is
normally used for personal, family, or household purposes (in-
cluding any such property intended to be attached to or installed
in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or
364. 119 CONG. REC. 29,480 (1973).
365. Id.
366. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2309, 2311 (1976).
367. See generally Leete, A Look at the Consumer Warranty Problem--The Federal So-
lution, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 351, 368-69 (1975).




installed)." '369 Although the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is
clearly narrower in scope than the Uniform Commercial Code, it
appears to be sufficiently broad to include almost any product
made and distributed in the commercial chain of consumer buy-
ing. The inclusion of fixtures within the definition of consumer
products is important because, under the common law of real
property, "fixtures such as hot water heaters and air conditioners
when incorporated into a dwelling became part of the real prop-
erty" 370 and therefore were removed from coverage under com-
mercial law. The Act, however, will continue to apply to such
products so long as they are considered to be a consumer product.
The Act specifically excludes from coverage the sale of seeds for
planting,37' whereas this type of sale would be included under Ar-
ticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.372
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act extends its protection to a
"consumer," who is defined as "a buyer (other than for purposes
of resale) of any consumer product or any person to whom such
product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written
warranty (or service contract). 373 Although the Act is applicable
to direct purchasers and transferees of direct purchasers, it does
not displace prior state law regarding persons not in privity with
the supplier and their ability to make claims as third party benefi-
ciaries of the warranty.374 This coverage of the Act is both
broader and narrower than the Code. It is broader because the
Act includes service contracts for consumer goods375 whereas the
Code directly applies only to transactions in goods. 376 Second, it
is narrower because the Act exclusively covers purchases of con-
369. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1976). See Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 154 Ga.
App. 13, 267 S.E.2d 274 (1980) (an airplane engine manufactured by an Alabama motor
manufacturing corporation is not a consumer product; therefore, the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act does not apply). ("It would stretch the greatest of imaginations to hold that an
aircraft engine is normally used 'for personal, family or household purposes.'" Id. at 17,
267 S.E.2d at 278.
370. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7702, 7717.
371. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(a)(2) (1976).
372. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.01(A)(8) (Page 1979).
373. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1976).
374. Id. See, eg., Richard W. Cooper Agency, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp.,
264 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. App. 1980). Ohio law regarding third party beneficiaries is discussed
supra at notes 328-42.
375. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(8) (1976) defines a service contract as "a contract in writing to
perform, over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration, services relating to the
maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer product"
376. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.02 (Page 1979).
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sumer goods, while the Code covers all goods.3 77
In order to be bound by the provisions of this Act, the seller of
the consumer product must be a "warrantor." A warrantor is de-
fined as "any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a
written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied
warranty. '378 A "supplier" refers to "any person engaged in the
business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly
available to consumers." 379
During debate in the House of Representatives, an amend-
ment to the Act was proposed that would limit the term "supplier"
to "any manufacturer, producer, distributor or retailer of a con-
sumer product" and restrict a warranty to "any undertaking by a
supplier. '3 0 The purpose of the amendment was to exclude
newspaper publishers, broadcasters and magazine publishers from
the Act's coverage and to retain the historical distinctions between
mere conduits for the dissemination of advertising and individuals
who personally guaranteed or warranted their products.38 '
In response to this amendment, Rep. Moss, cosponsor of the
Act, claimed that "it is not the intent of the committee nor was it
at any stage during the consideration of this legislation, that the
mere asking for the displaying of an advertisement in a newspaper
or on radio or television station would confer jurisdiction upon
the Federal Trade Commission. '382 While it is clear that the Act
was never intended to cover certain advertisements, it does apply
to the Good Housekeeping seal of approval, the Kosher seal, the
union bug, and other similar seals. The comments by Rep. Moss
make it clear that persons other than manufacturers or retailers
who make representations based on the testing of samples of
goods are bound by the provisions of the Act.
They are guarantors or warrantors of the product, and in many
instances the housewife shopping depends more upon the seal
of approval of Good Housekeeping magazine than she does
upon the actual guarantee provided by the supplier .... We
are not imposing here an unreasonable burden, but where a
magazine undertakes a role other than that of advertising,
where it undertakes the role of a warrantor of the product, then
it should be willing to assume all of the responsibility imposed
377. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.03(A)(1).
378. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (1976).
379. Id. § 2301(4).
380. 120 CONG. REC. 31,731 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Preyer).
381. Id. at 31,732.
382. Id. at 31,731-32 (remarks of Rep. Moss).
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by this new section of the bill upon any other warrantor or
guarantor of a 3product. I think that is a matter of elemental
fairness .... 38
Furthermore, the Act is not intended to apply to the isolated
sale of a consumer product. It is intended to cover only individu-
als who regularly engage in making consumer products directly or
indirectly available to consumers.384
Under the Act, the FTC has no authority to force a warrantor
to create a warranty. This Act applies only when the warrantor
has given the consumer a written warranty.385 A written warranty
includes any written affirmation of fact or promise made by a sup-
plier in connection with a sale of a consumer product which re-
lates to the material of the product or its workmanship.386 If the
written warranty affirms or promises that the material or the
workmanship is defect-free or creates an expectation in the con-
sumer that the consumer product will perform at a certain level
over a fixed period of time, then the consumer can enforce the
warranty under the Act.387 Additionally, a written warranty in-
cludes any written statement by a supplier of a consumer product
to refund, repair, replace, or take any other action necessary to
remedy the defect in the consumer product should it fail to com-
ply with the specifications enumerated in the writing. 88 Under
the provisions of the Act, a written warranty covers not only the
sales contract of consumer products, but also a contract to repair
those products.
The supplier's affirmation regarding the quality of the con-
sumer product, or an express statement providing remedial actions
in the event of a defect, may or may not be considered an effective
warranty. This uncertainty results from the difficulty of interpret-
ing the language of the Act, which requires that the supplier's af-
firmation or promise "becomes part of the basis of the bargain
between a supplier and a buyer. '3 89 Whether a written affirma-
tion, promise, or undertaking of the supplier becomes a part of the
383. Id. at 31,733.
384. H.R. REP. No. 1107, supra note 370, at 35, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 7717.
385. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1976). According to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26 (Page
1979), an express warranty need not be written. In fact, it can be created orally or by a
description, model or sample. Apparently, such nonwritten express warranties are ex-
cluded from coverage under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
386. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (1976).
387. Id.
388. Id. § 2301(6)(B).
389. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976).
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basis of the bargain between the buyer and the supplier is a ques-
tion of fact. Therefore, the trier of fact must look at the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction to ascertain whether the buyer
expected the writing to be part of the basis of the bargain. One
source that should prove helpful in analyzing this issue is the in-
terpretation of "basis of the bargain" found in decisions constru-
ing that language in the Code.39 °
Since the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not cover every
conceivable circumstance in which a warranty or service contract
could be given, subsection (a) of section 2311 "preserve[s] the au-
thority of the [Federal Trade] Commission to promulgate rules
and issue orders articulating the requirements of Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act with respect to warranties and
service contracts falling outside of the scope of title I."39 1 The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not operate to invalidate or
restrict any right or remedy available to a consumer under either
state or other federal laws.39 Furthermore, except for sections
2308, 2304(a)(2) and (4) nothing contained in the Act will "affect
the liability of or impose liability on, any person for personal in-
jury" or "supersede any provision of State law regarding conse-
quential damages for injury to the person or other injury. 3 93 Yet,
unless a state can demonstrate that its laws regarding written war-
390. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the "basis of the
bargain" test in the context of the Code.
391. H.R. REP. No. 1107, supra note 370, at 43 [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 7725.
392. 15 U.S.C. § 2311 (b)(1) (1976). See MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607 F.2d 1162
(5th Cir. 1979) (a court may resort to state law in determining the applicable damages
because the Act is "virtually silent" about the amount and type of damages which may be
awarded for breach of an express limited warranty).
393. Id. § 231 l(b)(2). The latter phrase clearly preserves the present rule. U.C.C. § 2-
719(3) states that any limitation of consequential damages for injury from consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 provides:
(a) Restrictions on disclaimers or modifications. No supplier may disclaim or
modify (except as provided in subsection (b) of this section) any implied warranty
to a consumer with respect to such consumer product if (I) such supplier makes
any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer product, or
(2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier enters into a
service contract with the consumer which applies to such consumer product.
(b) Limitation on duration. For purposes of this chapter (other than section
2304(a)(2) of this title), implied warranties may be limited in duration to the dura-
tion of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is consciona-
ble and is set forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently
displayed on the face of the warranty.
(c) Effectiveness of disclaimers, modifications, or limitations. A disclaimer,
modification, or limitation made in violation of this section shall be ineffective for




ranties afford greater consumer protection and do not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce, those state laws will be preempted by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
3 94
B. Requirements for Disclosure of Warranty Provisions
As noted above, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not
authorize the Federal Trade Commission to require a warranty in
connection with the sale of a consumer product or to prescribe the
duration of a written warranty.395 However, the Act does provide
that if a supplier decides to give a warranty, that warranty must
meet the requirements established by the FTC under its rulemak-
396ing powers.
Section 2302 contains disclosure provisions as well as provi-
sions which substantively regulate written warranties.397  The
[$]otwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor may not impose
any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on the product;
§ 2304(a)(4) provides:
[I]f the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or malfunction
after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy defects or mal-
functions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect ei-
ther a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part (as the
case may be). The Commission may by rule specify for purposes of this para-
graph, what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts to remedy particular
kinds of defects or malfunctions under different circumstances. If the warrantor
replaces a component part of a consumer product, such replacement shall include
installing the part in the product without charge.
394. Id., § 2311(c). But see MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir.
1979) (failure of the court to give an instruction was harmless error because the plaintiff
could not recover any more under the Act than was provided for under state law).
An example of a state statute which affords greater protection to the consumer and does
not unduly burden interstate commerce is the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KY.
REv. STAT. §§ 367.110-.300 (Supp. 1978). See Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiff sued Ford Motor Co. alleging an unfair trade practice in
violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act), noted in 6 N. Ky. L. Rv. 403 (1979).
395. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (1976).
396. Id. § 2309.
397. Section 2302(a) provides that the following items, among others, may be required
in a written warranty:
(1) The clear identification of the names and addresses of the warrantors.
(2) The identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended.
(3) The products or parts covered.
(4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunc-
tion, or failure to conform with such written warranty-at whose expense-and
for what period of time.
(5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.
(6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty.
(7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to ob-
tain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identifica-
tion of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set
forth in the warranty.
(8) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlemen,
19811
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
mandate of the Act regarding disclosure is important because
without it the consumer is unprotected in the marketplace. The
consumer who is not fully aware of the terms and conditions of
the warranty will not have the capacity to make an intelligent
evaluation of the goods purchased. Furthermore, without know-
ing of the terms and conditions of the warranty, the consumer
cannot understand what duties are incurred with respect to the
goods nor can the consumer know of any enforcement remedies
which the Act provides to protect the consumer. As a conse-
quence of the lack of knowledge, the consumer has paid part of
the purchase price for protection which is not understood and
which may not provide any benefit. Of course, the Act does em-
power the FTC to require any additional information from the
warrantor which it deems necessary to assist the consumer in un-
derstanding the language of the warranty and which will further
disclose the meaning that the warranty has.39 8
The FTC is responsible for prescribing rules governing the
availability of the warranty at or prior to the time of the sale.39 9
By requiring the vendor to provide a warranty which can be read
prior to the purchase of the consumer product, the buyer can com-
pare products and select the most appropriate one. Prior to the
Act, such written warranties were rare. Thus, the consumer had
no opportunity to compare the products of two or more suppliers
and select the one which offered the best warranty. Such devious
schemes as warranty registration cards4 °° would often result in a
buyer forfeiting, without knowing it, the right to warranties which
procedure offered by the warrantor and a recital, where the warranty so provides,
that the purchaser may be required to resort to such procedure before pursuing
any legal remedies in the courts.
(9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the consumer.
(10) The time at which the warrantor will perform any obligations under the
warranty.
(1 I) The period of time within which, after notice of a defect, malfunction, or
failure to conform with the warranty, the warrantor will perform any obligations
under the warranty.
(12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are
not covered by the warranty.
(13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead
a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty.
398. Id. § 2302(a)(13). See also Guides Against Deceptive Advertising of Guarantees,
16 C.F.R. § 239 (1980).
399. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)(A), (B) (1976).
400. A warranty registration card is usually a postcard found in the consumer product
package which requests the consumer to fill it out and return it to the manufacturer. This
leaves the impression on the consumer that unless the card is filled and returned to the
seller, no warranty will exist. Often these cards contain modifications of the original agree-
ment or even disclaimers of warranties that limit the rights of the consumer. Once the card
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had been bargained for prior to the purchase. Under the Act,4 ° 1
the attempted modification or disclaimer of implied warranties by
such a method would be prohibited. The Act requires that any
consumer product which has a written warranty must disclose that
warranty to the consumer prior to sale and no post-sale modifica-
tions or disclaimers will be effective.
The provisions of section 2302 apply only to written warranties
on consumer products "actually costing" the consumer more than
five dollars.4 "2 Any consumer product under five dollars escapes
the reach of section 2302. It is unclear, however, what "actually
costing" precisely means. Presumably, if the consumer wrote a
check for more than five dollars, the Act would apply to that sale.
A bit of legislative history, however, seems to indicate that "actu-
ally costing" was not meant to include sales taxes. 03 A consumer
product costing $4.90 plus $.20 in sales tax would not meet the
disclosure requirements of the Act even though the consumer's to-
tal cost was $5.10. On the other hand, when the consumer has
purchased a "multiple packaged item" the total cost of which ex-
ceeds five dollars, even though if separately sold the items would
sell for less than that, the "multiple packaged item" is within the
contemplation of this section.40"
Strangely, section 2303 applies only to "warranties which per-
tain to consumer products actually costing the consumer more
than $10 and which are not designated 'full (statement of dura-
tion) warranties.' ,,o This provision presents an apparent contra-
diction in jurisdictional amounts. Section 2302(e) provides that
this Act applies to all consumer products actually costing more
than five dollars. °6 Section 2303(d) states that this Act applies to
consumer products actually costing the consumer more than ten
dollars.4 7 The distinction lies in the fact that section 2302 makes
no attempt to designate the warranties either as "full" or "lim-
ited." Section 2302 of the Act applies to all written warranties
whether they fall within section 2303's limitations. This distinc-
is signed and returned, the seller has evidence of the limitations to which the buyer has
agreed. See generally U.C.C. § 2-312-16 (1972); 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
401. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
402. Id. § 2302(e).
403. H.R. REP. No. 1107, supra note 370, at 36, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 7719.
404. 40 FED. REG. 25,722 (June 12, 1975).
405. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(d) (1976).
406. Id. § 2302(e) (1976).
407. Id. § 2303(d) (1976).
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tion means that all warranties of consumer products costing more
than five dollars must fully disclose all terms, but only limited
warranties of consumer products costing more than ten dollars
must state their designation as a limited warranty.
A warrantor may not condition a written or implied warranty
on the warranted good being used in connection with any other
good or service identifiable by a brand, trade, or corporate name,
unless the tie-in good or service is provided without charge under
the terms of the warranty. Also, the warrantor may not tie-in a
good or service, unless the warrantor satisfies the FTC that its
product will not function properly otherwise and that the tie-in
arrangement is in the public interest.4 °8
C. Designation of Warranties and Minimum Standards
Any warrantor who offers a written warranty on a consumer
good which actually costs more than ten dollars must clearly and
conspicuously designate the warranty as either a "full (statement
of duration) warranty,"409 which must comply with the minimum
Federal standards for a warranty,410 or a "limited warranty,"'4 1'
which need not comply with all the Federal standards for a war-
ranty.41 2
408. Id. § 2302(c).
409. Id. § 2303(a)(1).
410. Section 2304(a) establishes the Federal minimum standards for a warranty. It pro-
vides:
In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written
warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty-
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such consumer product
within a reasonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect, mal-
function, or failure to conform with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor may not
impose any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on the prod-
uct;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for
breach of any written or implied warranty on such product, unless such ex-
clusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or mal-
function after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy
defects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the con-
sumer to elect either a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such
product or part (as the case may be). The Commission may by rule specify
for purposes of this paragraph, what constitutes a reasonable number of at-
tempts to remedy particular kinds of defects or malfunctions under different
circumstances. If the warrantor replaces a component part of a consumer
product, such replacement shall include installing the product without
charge.
411. 15 U.S.C. §2303(a)(2) (1976).
412. For an example of a limited warranty which complies with the Magnuson-Moss
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The duties of the warrantor under either a full warranty or a
limited warranty extend to each consumer with respect to the war-
ranted product. t3 The warrantor may impose no duties upon the
consumer as a condition precedent to securing a remedy under a
written warranty other than notification of the defect41 4 and mak-
ing the consumer good available to the warrantor free of encum-
brances.415 Although the warrantor need not compensate the
consumer for incidental expenses incurred in securing the remedy
(except if these are incurred because the remedy was not made in
a reasonable time or stem from an unreasonable duty imposed on
the consumer), the warrantor may not charge the consumer for
any costs incurred in providing the remedy.416 In Pratt v. Winne-
bago Industries, Inc. ,417 the court had an opportunity to determine
what duties a warrantor may place upon a consumer's right to a
remedy in the event of a defect. The consumer, who lived in
Pennsylvania, purchased a Winnebago motor home from the war-
rantor, who operated a retail outlet in Cleveland, Ohio. After the
sale, the consumer noticed several defects in the motor home, and
he took it to a local representative for repairs. While the Winne-
bago was being repaired, the consumer decided he did not want it
any more and notified the warrantor in Ohio that the Winnebago
was defective and that he wanted a full refund of the purchase
price. When the warrantor offered to repair the motor home in-
stead of providing a refund, the consumer sued. The court held
Warranty Act, see Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978). The 1976 war-
ranty which Ford gave to all new car and truck purchases provided in part, as follows:
LIMITED WARRANTY
1976 NEW CAR AND LIGHT TRUCK
Ford warrants for 1976 model cars and light trucks sold by Ford that the Selling
Dealer will repair or replace free any parts, except tires, found under normal use
in the U.S. or Canada to be defective in factory materials or workmanship within
the earliest of 12 months or 12,000 miles from either first use or retail delivery.
THERE IS NO OTHER EXPRESS WARRANTY ON THIS VEHICLE. ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS IS LIM-
ITED TO THE 12 MONTH/12,000 MILE DURATION OF THIS WRITTEN
WARRANTY. NEITHER FORD NOR ANY OF ITS DEALERS SHALL
HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE,
LOSS OF TIME, INCONVENIENCE, COMMERCIAL LOSS OR CONSE-
QUENTIAL DAMAGES.
Id. at 483. The Ford warranty was probably limited because it made repair or replacement
the only remedies in the event of a defect, rather than including the remedy of refund as
required in § 2304(a)(4).
413. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (1976).
414. Id. § 2304(b)(1).
415. Id. § 2304(b)(2).
416. Id. § 2304(d).
417. 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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that the consumer was not entitled to both rescission of the sales
contract and a refund of the purchase price by reasoning that the
consumer was entitled to a refund under section 2304(a)(4) only if
the product remained defective after a reasonable number of re-
pair attempts.418 The warrantor here had not had any opportuni-
ties to make repairs. Finally, the court allowed the warrantor to
require the consumer to bring the motor home to Ohio for repairs,
since the consumer should have expected such trips to be neces-
sary for regular maintenance.419
The supplier who issues a "full warranty" also assumes the du-
ties of repair, replacement, or refund if the consumer product is
defective. The supplier must also remedy the consumer product
defect within a reasonable time and without charge to the con-
sumer.420 The consumer, however, must allow the supplier to
make a reasonable number of attempts to repair the goods. Nev-
ertheless, the warrantor does not have a right to make an unlim-
ited number of attempts to repair a defective consumer product.
The number of attempts a warrantor can make will depend on the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. If the product remains
defective after reasonable attempts to repair, the consumer may
elect to replace the goods or receive a refund.42 The FTC, how-
ever, has the authority to establish rules as to how many repair
attempts are reasonable under the circumstances.422 The warran-
tor is not bound by the warranty if the consumer does not provide
reasonable and necessary maintenance on the consumer prod-
uct.423 Of course, the cost of litigating to determine what is rea-
sonable and necessary may make it impossible for the consumer
to complain, even though the burden of proof rests with the war-
rantor to show lack of reasonable and necessary care. The war-
rantor may designate a representative to perform his or her duties
under a warranty; however, this designation will not make the
representative a cowarrantor or relieve the warrantor of the obli-
gation to the consumer.424
418. Id. at 713-14.
419. Id. at 714.
420. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1976).
421. Id. § 2301(10).
422. Id. § 2304(a)(4).
423. Id. § 2304(c). See also id. § 2301(a)(9), which defines reasonable and necessary
maintenance as those duties which can reasonably be expected of the consumer and which
keep the consumer product performing at the intended level of performance or reasonably
close to that level.
424. 15 U.S.C. § 2307 (1976).
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Finally, it must be-noted that section 2305 provides that the
two types of warranties are not mutually exclusive.425 Therefore,
both full and limited warranties can arise on the same consumer
product so long as each warranty is clearly and conspicuously dis-
played.
D. Limitations on Disclaimer of Implied Warranties
Section 2308 of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act4 26 and sec-
tion 1302.29 of the Ohio Revised Code427 are parallel sections
dealing with the disclaimer of the implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose and merchantability. Manufacturers com-
monly give narrowly worded express warranties while disclaiming
all implied warranties. The consumer is led to believe that the
supplier is issuing an effective warranty for the consumer product
sold. However, in reality, the manufacturer has effectively limited
the consumer's rights and the manufacturer's liability in the event
the goods are defective. The similarity between the two sections
ends here. While section 1302.29 of the Ohio Revised Code per-
mits the limitation of implied warranties whenever an express
warranty is granted, under the Act no implied warranties may be
disclaimed by a warrantor who enters into a service contract at the
time of the sale or ninety days thereafter. In addition section 2308
precludes a disclaimer of implied warranties if the supplier has
offered a written warranty to the consumer with respect to the
consumer product.
When a supplier does not offer a written warranty and sells a
consumer product "as is" or "with all faults," this language oper-
ates to limit liability under both the Code428 and the Act.429 Even
though the Act requires the warrantor to give a warranty which is
written in understandable language, one of the Act's shortcomings
is its failure to protect the consumer fully from the impact of the
words "as is" and "with all faults" when they appear in a war-
ranty. Consumers often do not understand that these words mean
that any claim of nonconformity is waived, and that the warrantor
has escaped liability for any implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness. The Act would have been better drafted had it taken
425. Id. § 2305 (1976).
426. Id. § 2308. See note 393 supra.
427. See notes 264-304 supra and accompanying text.
428. Offlo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(C)(1) Page 1979).
429. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976).
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into account the impact of the words of art used by a supplier or
warrantor in making a written warranty.
Implied warranties may be limited so long as the limitation is
of reasonable duration, is conscionable, is set forth in clear and
unmistakable language, and is prominently displayed in the text
of the written warranty.4 3° Any other attempt to disclaim, modify,
or limit implied warranties is ineffective.43'
E. Remedies
In the remedies section of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
Congress explicitly states that "[The Act's] policy [is] to encourage
warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are
fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. '432 Furthermore, the Act authorizes the FTC
to establish minimum requirements for any informal dispute set-
tlement procedures. These procedures provide for participation
by independent or government entities.433 If a warrantor does es-
tablish an informal dispute settlement procedure which complies
with the FTC rules, then the consumer must resort to this proce-
dure prior to the commencement of an individual or class ac-
tion.434
If no settlement procedure is available or a consumer is pro-
tected inadequately under the dispute settlement procedure, then
an individual or class action suit may be brought in any proper
forum.435 The consumer must satisfy three new jurisdictional re-
quirements prior to bringing a class action in a district court: first,
the amount in controversy of any individual claim must not be
less than $25; second, the amount in controversy in the aggregate
must be more than $50,000; third, the number of named plaintiffs
in the class must be more than 100.436 The courts interpreting this
section of the Act have strictly construed the jurisdictional re-
quirements against the consumer class in an attempt to reduce the
number of class actions brought in federal district courts. For ex-
ample, in Barr v. General Motors Corp. ,43 a consumer brought a
430. Id. § 2308(b).
431. Id. § 2308(c).
432. Id. § 2310(a)(1).
433. Id. § 2310(a)(2).
434. Id. § 2310(a)(3).
435. Id. § 2310(d)(1).
436. Id. § 2310(d)(3).
437. 80 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1978). Accord, Watts v. Volkswagen Artiengesellschaft,
488 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ark. 1980). See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange
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class action on behalf of all persons who bought a 1977 Chevrolet
automobile painted with inappropriate or defective paint. The
consumer-plaintiff alleged that the potential class of plaintiffs was
more than 100. The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for cer-
tification of the class because the plaintiff's complaint did not con-
tain 100 named plaintiffs pursuant to the jurisdictional
prerequisite set forth in section 2310(d)(3)(c) of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act.
The Act empowers the Attorney General or the FTC to bring
suit in a federal district court to enjoin any warrantor from mak-
ing a deceptive warranty438 or to enjoin any person from failing to
comply with the obligations imposed by the Act.439 If there is a
likelihood of success in the action and it appears to be in the pub-
lic interest, then the court may issue a preliminary restraining or-
der or a temporary injunction without bond."0
In summary, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, although
flawed, is an important complement to state laws that offer con-
sumers warranty protection. The federal statute takes a different
tack from state laws by attempting to impose controls on the
wording of warranties. Regulation of this type gives the ordinary
buyer an opportunity to shop on the basis of the quality of war-
ranties and therefore purchase the level of protection he or she
desires.
IX. CONCLUSION
On the basis of this extensive analysis of warranty law under
the Uniform Commercial Code in general and the Ohio Revised
Code's version in particular, it should be evident that current war-
ranty law has evolved from the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor. Caveat emptor rewarded the seller's silence and en-
couraged the sale of inferior or defective items. The implied war-
Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979) (all class actions brought under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act must comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites set forth in
§ 23 10(d)(3)); Novosel v. Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. N.Y. 1978)
(plaintiff must comply with the amount in controversy requirement of § 2310(d)(3)(B) on
the basis of compensatory damages alone and is not permitted to include potential punitive
damages in order to have an amount in controversy of more than $50,000); Barnette v.
Chrysler Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Neb. 1977) (action for $7000 was dismissed for
failure to comply with the jurisdictional amount in controversy of $50,000).
438. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c)(1) (1976).
439. Id. See also Scott v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 481 F. Supp. 21 (D.C. Ill. 1979)
(district court has jurisdiction to hear case in which consumer claimed damages for failure
of service contractor to comply with obligation of service contract).
440. Id.
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ranties of the Code provide some protections for the buyer while
forcing the seller to police the sale of goods. Although the Uni-
form Sales Act clearly began the trend, the Code and the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act have crystalized the improvements
in warranty law.
Several improvements in the evolution of sales law deserve
specific consideration. First, the warranty of title is particularly
well drafted and provides significant protection. The automatic
attachment of the warranty and avoidance of the express-implied
dichotomy is particularly commendable. In fact, it is probably in
accordance with the general expectation of buyers; buyers expect
the seller to possess the title to goods as well as to be able to pass
such title free from any encumbrances. By requiring the seller to
exclude or modify this warranty with specific language, the Code
prevents a sharpdealing seller from conveying an encumbered
good free from a warranty of title. Under the Code, the buyer
must possess knowledge of potential or actual defects in the good's
title before it may be excluded.
Second, the Code's elimination of the "patent or other trade
name" exception to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is especially noteworthy. Given the exponential increase
in advertising by trade name, coupled with the common usage of
generic terms to indicate the type of goods an individual desires to
purchase, it is easily conceivable that a buyer asking for a "Hoo-
ver" or "Wonder Bread" may rely on a seller's skill in selecting
the desired good. Under prior law, the above buyer would be con-
sidered to have self-selected the goods. Therefore, no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose would arise. Under
the Code, however, the designation of a trade name is only one
factor to be considered, and it does not automatically prevent the
creation of an implied warranty of fitness so long as the requisite
reliance on the seller's skill is present.
The Code strikes a fair balance between buyers and sellers.
The buyer is given considerable warranty protection, while the
seller is not required to insure the goods sold and is permitted to
disclaim warranties on the goods. Most of the Code's disclaimer
provisions are designed to notify the buyer that he or she is
purchasing goods without certain types of warranty protections.
Despite the improvements in warranty law under the Code, the
"as is" sale remains a problem. An "as is" sale permits the seller
to exclude all implied warranties. The language may be buried in
a lengthy document and may not adequately inform the buyer of
[Vol. 31:211
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its effect. Clearly, the language "with all faults" is more informa-
tive, but the "as is" approach has received greater usage. The
elimination of the "as is" language would be the best solution;
failing that, the language should at least be subject to the conspic-
uousness requirement.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act appears to be a valuable
tool for the consumer interested in shopping around for the best
warranty. In fact, if all consumers were to engage in this type of
behavior, then the Act should conceivably operate in a manner
that induces sellers to offer improved warranties in order to in-
crease sales. Indeed, the drafters of the Act were confident that
market forces would operate to force the manufacturers of goods
to give better warranties and, ultimately, market a better product.
However, because of its recent enactment and the relative paucity
of case law, "the jury is still out," so to speak on whether the Act
will actually produce any substantial improvements in warranty
law.
